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ABSTRACT 
Researcher: Sergio Teixeira 
Title: Helicopter Flight Operational Quality Assurance (HFOQA): Development 
of HFOQA Analysis Software 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Master of Science in Aeronautics 
Year: 2006 
Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA), or Flight Data Monitoring (FDM), has 
benefited flight safety in both fixed-wing and helicopter operations. The relative youth of 
FOQA programs has resulted in their minimal application among the helicopter fleets of 
the world; thus, Helicopter FOQA (HFOQA) has merited consolidation and expansion. 
This mixed methods design developed HFOQA analysis software via a blend of the 
qualitative data from helicopter and FOQA experts with quantitative data represented by 
a sample of de-identified digital flight data from 1,014 helicopter flights. Development of 
the software emphasized three domains of interest: (a) helicopter flight phases; (b) 
helicopter operational and maintenance events; and (c) helicopter event-related and 
safety/efficiency flight profile measurements. This study's resultant HFOQA analysis 
software has direct application to multifaceted helicopter operations (Emergency Medical 
Services [EMS], sightseeing, military, and others), and, in fact, has been utilized by an 
offshore helicopter operator in its daily operations. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA), a proactive aviation safety 
program, has continually monitored digital aircraft flight data, irrespective of any 
incident/accident occurrence. The routine collection and analysis of normal flight 
operational data has increased safety and decreased costs (Flight Safety Foundation 
[FSF], 2004). FOQA has provided a comprehensive, objective overview and risk 
assessment capability of the aircraft operation - pilot performance, aircraft condition, and 
the environment - in providing the aforementioned benefits (Federal Aviation 
Administration [FAA], 2004). The waiting for a tragedy to occur to obtain operational 
knowledge and prevent accidents has been obviated by FOQA. 
FOQA also has existed under different names around the world, such as Flight 
Data Monitoring (FDM) and Flight Data Analysis (FDA). The European commercial 
airlines originally introduced the systematic and proactive use of flight data from routine 
operations in the 1960s. Since then, this safety assessment process has gained acceptance 
due to the advancing technology and the expertise shared throughout the industry. In the 
United States (U.S.), during the 1990s, the airlines began to establish a similar program 
and became familiar with its advantages. In recent years, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) has approved FOQA as a standard for some commercial transport 
aircraft beginning January 1, 2005 (FSF, 2004). 
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Air carriers with FOQA implemented in their fixed-wing fleet have seen several 
benefits of continuously monitoring flights. The direct benefits have been the 
improvement of safety, training, operational, and maintenance procedures. At the same 
time, problems with Air Traffic Control (ATC) procedures, airport characteristics, and 
aircraft operation and design were brought forward and addressed. Some financial 
considerations and cost savings have also been mentioned; for example, insurance and 
fuel savings (FSF, 2004). 
FOQA has been consolidated, earned trust, and assisted stakeholders within the 
air carrier industry during the execution of business. It has become unavoidable to ask 
whether the program will extend its range beyond the fixed-wing industry; the helicopter 
market with its diverse operational characteristics has already had some affirmative 
answers. 
Large numbers of rotorcraft have participated in a broad variety of aviation 
activities. According to FAA registration data, an estimated 10,844 civil rotorcraft were 
active in the U.S. at the end of October 2005; 2.265 million hours were flown in 2005. 
The total market value of used helicopters traded in U.S. in 2005, for example, was 
$783.9 million (Helicopter Association International [HAI], 2006). This impressive 
volume of activity and wealth has necessitated safety operations. 
The U.S. civil helicopter (non-commercial and commercial) accident rate was 
8.09 accidents per 100,000 flight hours in 2004 and 8.52 in 2005. The latter accident rate 
was based upon National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accidents posted through 
mid-December 2005 (HAI, 2006). The commercial helicopter accident rate was 2.25 
accidents per 100,000 hours in 2004. All these numbers have been more or less static for 
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the past decade and were "too high" and "not appropriate" (R. Flater as cited in Klein, 
2006, p. 1). Iseler and De Maio (2001), using the number of departures as the exposure 
factor in their analysis of U.S. civil rotorcraft accidents from 1990 to 1996, stated that 
"the airline fatal and total accidents rates are about one tenth those of the corresponding 
helicopter rates" (p. 1). The HAI and the American Helicopter Society (AHS) announced 
on January 31, 2006 the formation of a consortium of operators, manufacturers, and 
government regulatory agencies; the International Helicopter Safety Team (IHST) has 
been tasked to reduce helicopter accidents 80% by 2016 (IHST, 2006b). 
Public transportation by helicopter has presented unique characteristics that 
increase the risk of the operation and also deserve to be routinely mapped utilizing 
objective data. Emergency Medical Services (EMS) aviation operations, sightseeing 
helicopter flights, and offshore helicopter operations have provided significant 
representation. 
EMS flights, for example, have occurred under the natural pressure of quickly 
transporting patients or donor organs to emergency care facilities. The hazards associated 
with EMS operations have resulted in an increasing number of accidents which has not 
been seen since the 1980s. Between January 2002 and January 2005, 16 EMS helicopter 
fatal accidents occurred in the United States, killing 39 people (NTSB, 2006d). 
The air tour industry has its own uniqueness. In one instance, an accident 
investigation report indicated that a sightseeing helicopter crew succumbed to pressure to 
fly in bad weather in 1999. The NTSB reported that helicopter flights were included in 
more than half of 19 sightseeing flight fatal accidents, killing 43 people, since January 
2000 (Klein, 2006). 
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Offshore helicopter operations (to be discussed further) have been distinguished 
by over-water flights in an oil and gas environment, including turbulence and hot gas 
areas. All three aforementioned types of public transportation might have regularly 
occurred close to terrain or water, in severe weather, or at unfamiliar landing sites, and 
are highly subject to environmental conditions. Therefore, they have been inherently 
dangerous operations and an efficient hazard assessment and risk control program is 
needed (NTSB, 2006d). 
The worldwide offshore helicopter operations, in particular, have been impressive 
because of the numbers and characteristics involved. In 2004, 8.5 million passengers 
were carried in oil industry helicopter operations (offshore, seismic, geophysical, 
pipeline, and others activities), with 2.5 million flights worldwide (International 
Association of Oil & Gas Producers [OGP], 2006). Clark (2000) compared the travel 
scenarios and relative travel risk experienced by an airline business passenger in an 
airplane and an offshore worker in a helicopter. The fixed-wing passenger flew at a high 
altitude in air-conditioned comfort, preceded by a short briefing on the use of the seat belt 
and lifejacket, and was advised on the nearest exit. The offshore worker, flew above 
unforgiving freezing waters like the North Sea, must have had prior training on helicopter 
underwater escape, and watched a detailed video on helicopter evacuation. The offshore 
helicopter passenger wore a thermal liner, an immersion suit, and a lifejacket with self-
breathing equipment providing 15 to 20 seconds of air under water in case of ditching. 
The helicopter flight was in a very loud, cramped, and high-vibration environment. To 
escape underwater, a window beside the seat must be pushed out after releasing its seal. 
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In summary, the accident risk that an offshore worker has faced has been significantly 
higher than that of a regular airline passenger. 
The Gulf of Mexico has encompassed the largest offshore helicopter fleet in the 
world with a total of 589 aircraft in 2005 (Williams, 2006). This fleet has been 
responsible for 71% of the offshore flights and 42% of worldwide flight hours, according 
to 2004 data from OGP (2006). These statistics emphasize the importance of keeping this 
flight operations area safe. However, the accident rate and other safety numbers have not 
been improving. The Helicopter Safety Advisory Conference (HSAC; Williams, 2006) 
stated that 2004, with 15 lives lost, was the worst year in terms of fatalities in the 21 
years of gathering data in the Gulf of Mexico. The helicopter accident rate per 100,000 
flight hours in 2005 was 2.05. That has been a particularly unsatisfactory number when 
compared to the 22-year annual average accident rate of 1.89. The Gulf of Mexico 
numbers have evolved to accident rates notably higher than those of the North Sea. 
The North Sea has had the second largest offshore helicopter fleet with 100 
aircraft, covering 10% of worldwide flights and 15% of the total worldwide hours flown. 
In contrast to the current Gulf of Mexico accident rate, a fairly constant diminishing 
accident rate has been observed in the North Sea. Despite the fact that the North Sea 
operations have been carried out over longer distances and often in more severe weather, 
no accidents have occurred during the last 2 years of available data - 2003 and 2004. The 
most recent offshore helicopter accident in the North Sea occurred in 2002; the accident 
rate per 100,000 flight hours for that year was 1.96 (OGP, 2006). 
A closer look at the North Sea safety approach to offshore helicopter operations 
has been revealing. The United Kingdom (UK) Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has been 
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promoting safety review meetings with the industry in order to develop and guarantee 
helicopter airworthiness for public transportation (Howson, 2005). A partnership among 
the offshore helicopter stakeholders of the UK has resulted in extensive research to 
improve safety. The ongoing research process resulted in the creation of the Helicopter 
Operations Monitoring Programme (HOMP), which was the first FOQA-type program 
applied to helicopters (CAA, 2002). 
The HOMP project began as a trial in 1999; two related, final reports were 
released in 2002 and 2004 by the CAA. Two offshore helicopter operators and two 
different types of helicopters participated in the HOMP trial. The application of FOQA to 
helicopter operations was considered a success. Consequently, the UK Offshore 
Operators Association (UKOOA) committed its members to implement the program on 
all Flight Data Recorder (FDR)-equipped UK public transport helicopters over the UK 
Continental Shelf (UKCS; CAA, 2002). Moreover, Shell Oil Company has recently 
required a FOQA-type program in its contract with a European helicopter operator on 
some helicopters that the company has used in the North Sea (Croft, 2005). 
Although FOQA has already proven to be a feasible tool and a safety advantage 
for offshore helicopters operators, the aviation industry has been awaiting its 
consolidation and subsequent expansion. The course of FOQA development progress 
with helicopters has been forecast to follow that of fixed-wing FOQA. The HOMP trial 
was the first step and the basis for this study. FOQA analysis software suppliers, highly 
experienced in the field, have started transferring know-how and familiarizing themselves 
with this powerful helicopter safety tool. 
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Statement of the Problem 
FOQA has attained the status of a powerful aviation safety tool that increases 
flight safety and efficiency in both fixed-wing and helicopter operations. The relative 
youth of FOQA programs has resulted in their minimal application as tools among the 
helicopter fleets of the world. Current helicopter FOQA analysis software programs have 
arrived at a point in time where they merit consolidation and expansion. 
Delimitations 
The exclusive focus of this study has been the FOQA analysis software. The 
development of a helicopter version of the FOQA software addressed both operational 
and maintenance parameters. Although the industry has usually referred to the latter as 
Maintenance Operational Quality Assurance (MOQA), this study has concentrated on 
maintenance as well as flight operations under the FOQA rubric. 
The analyzed flight data were historical and used solely as a means of verification 
and validation. No safety or efficiency appraisal was made regarding the quality of the 
helicopter operations that produced the data. Moreover, the flight data and the software 
ownership have remained confidential. Additionally, the costs associated with the 
helicopter FOQA have not been assessed. 
Definition of Terms 
The following list of key terms and their definitions has been prepared as a quick 
reference to facilitate reading of the report. 
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Dead Man's Curve (DMC) or height velocity curve: A chart (height on the y-axis 
and velocity on the x-axis) depicting combinations of airspeed and altitude that do not 
provide sufficient stored energy to permit a safe landing of the helicopter in the event of 
an engine failure (Cantrell, 2006). 
Event: An occurrence or condition in which predetermined limits of aircraft 
parameters have been exceeded (FAA, 2004). 
Fixed-wing aircraft: A generic term used to refer to what are more commonly 
known as airplanes (Wikipedia Encyclopedia, 2006) 
Flight Data Analysis (FDA): "Flight Data Analysis (FDA) is the systematic 
collection of flight data to improve safety and operational efficiency" (IATA, 2004, ^fl). 
Flight Data Monitoring (FDM): "Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) is the 
systematic, pro-active, and non-punitive use of digital flight data from routine operations 
to improve aviation safety" (CAA, 2003, p. 1). 
Flight Data Recorder (FDR): A device that records pertinent parameters and 
technical information about a flight. A FDR is designed to withstand the forces of a crash 
so that information recorded by it may be used to reconstruct the circumstances leading 
up to the accident (FAA, 2004). 
Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA): "A voluntary program for the 
routine collection and analysis of flight operational data to provide more information 
about, and greater insight into, the total flight operations environment. A FOQA program 
combines these data with other sources and operational experience to develop objective 
information to enhance safety, training effectiveness, operational procedures, 
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maintenance and engineering procedures, and air traffic control (ATC) procedures" 
(FAA, 2004, p. 4). 
FOQA, FDMf or FDA: Different acronyms for aviation safety programs that make 
use of digital, recorded aircraft flight data, even if no accident occurs (Author). 
Ground resonance: Emergency situation developed when the helicopter rotor 
blades move out of phase with each other and cause the rotor disc to become unbalanced. 
This phenomenon has resulted in the entire hull being ripped apart by the aircraft's own 
extreme oscillations (Lewis & Darbo, 2006). 
Helicopter FOQA (HFOQA): The adaptation of the FOQA process, emphasizing 
the development of unique analysis software to be used by the helicopter industry in any 
of its multifaceted operations (Author). 
Helicopter Operations Monitoring Programme (HOMP): A North Sea helicopter 
version of fixed-wing FOQA programs (Author). 
Helideck: Offshore industry terminology for the heliport(s)/helipad(s) located on 
the offshore drilling rigs (Author). 
Parameter exceedance analysis or event detection: The examination for aircraft-
parameters beyond predetermined thresholds in a specific occurrence, or a programmed 
event (FAA, 2004). 
Parameters: "Measurable variables that supply information about the status of an 
aircraft system or subsystem, position, or operating environment. Parameters are 
collected by a data acquisition unit installed on the aircraft and then sent to analysis and 
reporting systems" (FAA, 2004, p. 5). 
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Quick Access Recorder (QAR): A recording unit onboard the aircraft that stores 
flight-recorded data, and are designed to provide quick and easy access to the data (FAA, 
2004). 
Safety Management System (SMS): The effective and comprehensive safety 
structure developed and maintained by an air transport organization for managing safety, 
through an inclusive safety culture (CAA, 2003). 
Special Event Search and Master Analysis (SESMA): "The first ever FDM 
system" (CAA, 2002, Section 3, p. 1). 
Statistical analysis or routine flight data measurement: The statistical use of data 
from all flights to determine risk for an airline without focusing on specific event 
exceedances (FAA, 2004). 
Validation: "The process of determining that the requirements are the correct 
requirements and that they are complete" (CAA, 2003, Appendix A, p. 2). 
Verification: "The evaluation of the results of a process to ensure correctness and 
consistency with respect to the input and standards provided to that process" (CAA, 
2003, Appendix A, p. 2). 
Chapter II 
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
The helicopter industry has not entirely incorporated the same improvements in 
design, equipment, operating procedures, training, and maintenance practices as the 
airline industry. A large number of helicopters have been operated with the same criteria 
and procedures that the air carriers' aircraft were 30 years ago. The key steps that the 
airlines have taken to improve their safety could be replicated by helicopters with similar 
effects (Stevens & Sheffield, 2006). 
FOQA and the Airline Industry 
The aviation industry represented by the airlines has strengthened its business and 
public credibility through a long-term investment in safety. Extraordinary advances in 
aircraft airworthiness, airport and navigation facilities, air traffic management, and pilot 
training through high-fidelity flight simulator devices, for example, reduced the accident 
rates significantly in the past (Matthews, 2002). These features have already been 
incorporated into the airline industry and their roles continue to exist within the system. 
However, the increasing numbers of flights over the years has caused the airline industry 
to not accept the current low accident rates. More flights have represented more accidents 
and losses if the number of accidents per flight has remained the same as the past (FAA, 
2004). FOQA, incorporated into a Safety Management System (SMS), has been 
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highlighted as one of the safety programs with the potential to minimize the low, but 
steady, long-term accident rate per airline departures (FSF, 2004). 
SMS and FOQA 
The SMS has been generally defined as the effective and comprehensive safety 
structure developed and maintained by an air transport organization for managing safety. 
A commitment to minimizing the risk of flight operations through an inclusive safety 
culture has been the focus of the SMS. An effective SMS has relied basically on 
information obtained from all sources available from the aviation industry to predict risks 
(CAA, 2003); an example has been the information from voluntary, non-punitive incident 
and hazard reporting programs (CAA, 2002). Regulatory authorities and organizations 
involved with air transportation safety have geared their plans and actions to achieve 
safety in a partnership culture with the industry. The capability of the SMS and Oversight 
Systems to collect, integrate, and analyze data from different sources has been the major 
trend initiative demonstrated in projects for the future. The FAA has planned to establish 
a full SMS and Oversight System by 2008. The ICAO target date for SMS and Safety 
Management Oversight Systems implementation has been 2011. In the U.S., the Next 
Generation of Air Transport System (NGATS), with full integration and linking among 
federally related air transport agencies, has been projected for 2025 (D. Farrow, personal 
communication, January 21, 2006). 
FOQA has delivered objective, quantitative data from the airlines of the world to 
the SMSs. The program has been included in operators' overall operational risk 
assessment and prevention programs. FOQA data, obtained from special acquisition 
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devices, such as Quick Access Recorders (QARs), or directly from the Flight Data 
Recorders (FDRs), have discovered and addressed risk, thereby enhancing air safety 
(FAA, 2004). 
FOQA Definition 
The primary characteristic that has distinguished FOQA from other safety 
reporting programs has been that FOQA has provided objective, quantitative data. The 
program, instead of relying on perceived problems or risks subjectively reported by 
individuals, has yielded precise information on many aspects of flight operations. Such 
information has been used to objectively evaluate a wide range of safety-related issues 
(General Accounting Office [GAO], 1997). 
The FSF (2004) has defined the FOQA program as the process of obtaining and 
analyzing data recorded in flight operations to improve safety. The CAA (2003) has 
emphasized the systematic, pro-active, and non-punitive use of the program. Non-
punitive has meant that information obtained from FOQA would not be used, for 
example, as the basis for a disciplinary action against a pilot (FSF, 2004). In the U.S., the 
FAA (2004) has additionally addressed the voluntary aspects of the program and the 
protection assurance of the submitted data, under Title 14 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (14 CFR) Part 193. "Protection of data sources" has meant that "data could 
not be disclosed publicly or for purposes other than aviation safety" (FSF, 2004, p. 2). 
ICAO and its 188 contracting states, followed by the European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA), have ratified the FOQA data protection issue (Wall, 2006). 
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FOQA History 
At least eight non-U.S. airlines have had FOQA/FDM programs in operation for 
more than 34 years (GAO, 1997, p. 20). A forerunner of British Airways and TAP Air 
Portugal have received credit as the first airlines in the world to use FDM techniques 
during the early 1960s (FSF, 2004). The CAA (2002) proclaimed that the FDM history 
has been in alignment with one of its "longest miming safety research projects: the Civil 
Aircraft Airworthiness Data Recording Programme (CAADRP)" (Section 3, p. 1). The 
CAADRP's efforts to improve aviation safety through FDM in the 1960s relied on flight 
data recorders with ultraviolet paper as the medium to collect data from the jet transports 
then entering service. This diligent work "led to the development of the Special Event 
Search and Master Analysis (SESMA) program - the first ever FDM system" (Section 3, 
p. 1). SESMA has developed into the British Airways' FDM program and an essential 
component of the airline's SMS. 
British Airways' FDM program has served as the model for similar programs in 
the U.S. and around the world (GAO, 2002). For example, in Asia, All Nippon Airways 
began a program to analyze flight data in 1974 and Japan Airline's FOQA program has 
been in effect for more than 24 years (GAO, 1997). In the 1980s and 1990s many non-
U.S. airlines shared their FOQA expertise in seminars and workshops promoted by the 
FSF. In a 1993 study for the FAA, the FSF coined the term Flight Operational Quality 
Assurance and stated that there were "approximately 25 air carriers with FOQA-like 
programs" worldwide (FSF, 2004, p. 2). 
In July 1995, the FAA initiated a 3-year $5.5 million FOQA Demonstration 
Project (DEMOPROJ) to encourage the voluntary implementation of FOQA programs by 
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U.S. airlines. The FAA project initially provided hardware and software to US Airways, 
United Airlines, and Continental Airlines, which met the DEMOPROJ requirements 
(GAO, 2002). Other airlines began to consider FOQA programs; by 1997, about 33 
foreign airlines and four U.S. airlines had implemented FOQA or FOQA-type programs 
(GAO, 1997). 
From 1997 to 2004, the FAA worked together with the Department of Justice and 
aviation industry stakeholders to develop a proposed FOQA rule that would be acceptable 
to all interested parties. In 2001, the 14 CFR Part 193 became effective and provided 
protection to U.S. air carriers from enforcement actions based on FOQA data; in 2004 the 
FOQA Advisory Circular (AC) was published by the FAA. According to the FSF (2004), 
the FOQA AC has provided "the most complete guidance yet for U.S. air carriers on 
acceptable methods of establishing a FOQA program with all the available regulatory 
protections" (p. 2). (An amplified timeline of notable events pertaining to the evolution of 
FOQA has been delineated within Table 1.) 
Since the 1960s, the number of airlines that have implemented FOQA has risen 
steadily. Femandes (2002) affirmed that approximately 70 air carriers worldwide had 
established fully operational FOQA/FDM programs by that year. (The FSF [2004] added 
that another 50 carriers were at various stages of establishing programs during that time.) 
These numbers evolved partially as a result of ICAO involvement. ICAO recommended 
implementation of FOQA on aircraft certificated with a Gross Takeoff Weight (GTW) of 
more than 20,000 kilograms (44,000 pounds) effective January 1, 2002. ICAO and EASA 
later ratified FOQA as a standard on airplanes with a maximum GTW greater than 27,000 
kilograms (60,000 pounds) effective January 1, 2005 (FSF, 2004). 
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Table 1 
FOQA Timeline (Adaptedfrom the GAO, 2002; CAA, 2002; and FSF, 2004) 
Date Agency/Industry Action 
Early 1960s British Airways / CAA TAP Air Portugal Inaugurate use of FOQA programs. 
1974 All Nippon Airways Begins a program to analyze flight data. 
1980s and 
1990s 
1993 
July 1995 
1997 
1997-2004 
1998 
July 2000 
July 2001 
FSF 
FSF 
March 1993 FAA 
FAA 
DOJ 
FAA and DOJ 
FAA 
FAA 
A * ™™ Jom t service safety 
August 2000 , .
 f
 J 
FAA 
Non-U.S. airlines shared their FOQA expertise in seminars 
and workshops. 
Publishes study recognizing that acceptance of FOQA 
programs by the aviation industry hinges on adequate 
protection of data collected. 
Begins rulemaking effort. However, progress quickly stalled 
by airline concerns about FAA's intended use of FOQA data. 
Begins a FOQA demonstration project and issues statement 
indicating commitment to using FOQA data for safety 
analysis purposes only. 
Cautioned FAA that a federal regulator may not be able to 
exempt regulated parties from enforcement actions, even 
information is submitted voluntarily. 
Work together to develop a proposed FOQA rule that would 
be acceptable to all stakeholders. 
Publishes a policy statement indicating intent to use FOQA 
data for enforcement purposes, but only when rule violations 
are egregious. 
Formally publishes a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on 
voluntary implementation of FOQA programs by U.S. 
airlines. 
Formally endorse military FOQA programs (MFOQA), and 
recommend full funding for their implementation. 
Rule issued protecting voluntarily submitted aviation safety 
and security data are protected from release under Freedom 
of Information Act. 
October 2001 FAA and DOT Publication of final FOQA rule. 
November 2001 FAA 14 CFR Part 13 FOQA data inviolable. 
September 2003 FAA 14 CFR Part 193 FOQA participant confidentiality. 
2004 FAA AC 120-82 FOQA programs. 
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Thus, FOQA has become a well established practice among fixed-wing operators, 
having demonstrated enhanced safety and other benefits. The growth in the number of 
airlines utilizing FOQA has been illustrated by Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. The Growth of the Number of Airlines that Implemented FOQA Techniques 
throughout the Years (Adapted from Fernandes, 2002). 
FOQA Benefits 
Post-crash analysis of FDR data has played a crucial role in determining accident 
causes. As opposed to the post-accident or -incident use, FOQA has routinely examined 
the digital data from uneventful airline flights to identify potential problems and correct 
them before they lead to accidents (GAO, 1997). The most important benefits from 
FOQA have certainly been safety related (CAA, 2002). 
The detection of "technical flaws, unsafe practices, or conditions outside of 
desired operating procedures" (GAO, 1997, p. 1) has allowed improvement in "flight 
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crewmembers' performance, air carrier training programs, operating procedures, air 
traffic control (ATC) procedures, airport maintenance and design, aircraft operations and 
design" (FSF, 2004, pp. 1-2). The Global Aviation Information Network (GAIN) stated 
that "a successful FOQA program encourages adherence to standard operating procedures 
(SOPs), deters nonstandard behavior and so enhances flight safety" (FSF, 2004, p. 2). 
The CAA (2002) illustrated FOQA safety-related benefits with the results of a 
study by Scandia Insurance. The report compared FAA data to associated data from non-
U.S. airlines as illustrated by Figure 2. The comparison underscored that airlines using 
FOQA data for 7-14 years had a lower accident rate than the U.S. airlines. Those airlines 
that used FOQA for more than 14 years had an accident rate less than half the rate 
experienced by the U.S. carriers. 
Hull Losses as a Percent of Total Turbine Fleet. FOQA user vs. U.S. 
vs. World 
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Figure 2. Safety Benefits of FOQA (Adapted from CAA, 2002). 
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The FSF (2004) presented flight operational issues that have been addressed by 
the airlines utilizing FOQA analysis: 
Air carriers with FOQA programs have used flight data to identify problems such 
as unstabilized approaches and rushed approaches; exceedance of flap limit 
speeds; excessive bank angles after takeoff; engine over-temperature events; 
exceedance of recommended speed thresholds; ground-proximity warning system 
(GPWS)/terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) warnings; onset of stall 
conditions; excessive rate of rotation; glide path excursions; and vertical 
acceleration, (p. 2) 
Another range of possibilities has been related to the scope of FOQA successes. 
For example: 
1. The FSF (2004) described FOQA analysis as having been used to determine 
that "aircraft problems were induced by runway surface conditions" (p. 18). 
2. Excessive tire wear resulted from ATC instructions to land and hold short of 
an intersection runway. 
3. An instrument approach was causing unstabilized approaches and should be 
redesigned. 
4. Minimum radar-vectoring altitudes in mountainous terrain should be 
increased, preventing GPWS warnings. 
5. Pilot training on GPWS escape maneuvers should be improved. 
6. Air carriers' warranty claims to airframe, engine, and equipment 
manufacturers and air carriers' insurance premiums reduction requests were 
reasonable ones. 
Although the improvement of flight safety has been the driving force behind 
FOQA (FAA, 2004), the airline industry has seen cost-related benefits as well. Falcon 
(2003) stated that US Airways revealed that FOQA resulted in more than $100 million in 
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maintenance savings in 5 years; ". . . its aircraft engines were frequently operating at 
higher than recommended temperatures. Since implementing FOQA, those overtemps 
have been reduced by 87 percent" fl| 1). "Delta Airlines also experienced significant 
procedure improvements after putting FOQA into practice, reducing flap over-speeds 
[sic] (employing wing flaps at higher than recommended speeds) from 46 to 10 
occurrences per quarter" (Falcon, 2003, f 2). 
The CAA (2003) summarized the following examples of where FOQA data has 
produced cost savings, in addition to safety improvements, for a wide range of operators: 
1. Engine savings - ECM [Engine Condition Monitoring] - Postponed/reduced 
removals, recording of use of derate. 
2. Fuel savings - trim analysis, airframe differences. 
3. Fuel tankering - more accurate burn calculations. 
4. Brake savings - better crew awareness and highlighting heavy use. 
5. Flap maintenance savings - fewer overspeeds and use as a "drag flap." 
6. Inspections savings - reduced number required due to availability of 
maximum values for heavy landings, engine overtemp' [sic], flap placard, etc. 
7. Safety savings - improved safety estimated from probable hull loss rates. 
8. Insurance savings - based on experience of long term FDM operators. 
9. Increased aircraft availability - better/faster fault diagnosis. 
10. Repair savings - reduced numbers of tailstrikes, heavy landings, etc. 
11. Reduced ACARS [Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting 
System] costs - ECMS [Environmental Control and Monitoring System] and 
other data collection from QAR. 
12. Increased simulator effectiveness - better targeted. 
13. ETOPS [Extended Twin Engine Operations] monitoring - automatic rather 
than manual. 
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14. Warranty support - definitive usage evidence. 
15. Autoland support - record keeping and system health/accuracy. (Appendix E, 
pp. 2-3) 
FOQA Process and Key Elements 
The CAA (2002) affirmed that the objective of FOQA systems was to enable an 
airline to identify, quantify, assess, and address operational risks through the "closed 
loop" process shown in Figure 3. 
yes 
Continuously 
Identify and 
quantify risks 
Was action 
effective? No yes 
Are risks 
acceptable? 
Take remedial 
action 
Figure 3. The "Closed Loop" FOQA Process (Adapted from CAA, 2003). 
FOQA data have typically originated from various onboard systems and sensors 
throughout the aircraft (GAO, 1997). The Flight Data Acquisition Unit (FDAU) and the 
QAR, utilizing either a Personal Computer Memory Card International Association 
(PCMCIA) card or an optical disk cartridge as a storage device, have gathered, processed, 
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and managed the digital data representing multiple parameters of flight. The FAA (2004) 
provided an overview of the total process from the data capture through the data analysis 
and utilization. 
In the FAA-described FOQA routine, data have been periodically retrieved and 
sent to the air carrier's FOQA office for analysis, using one of several available 
transmission methods. The methods for transferring data have been ground-based 
transportation, electronic, or wireless transmission; all have required close coordination 
and the retrieval time period has needed to coincide with the recording medium's 
memory capacity. The FOQA office has been located within the flight safety organization 
of the air carrier. There, the data have then been validated and analyzed using specialized 
processing and analysis software, known as the Ground Data Replay and Analysis 
System (GDRAS). The validation process has been the data review "to see that they were 
not generated as a result of erroneous recording or damaged sensors" (FAA, 2004, p. 3). 
The two analysis techniques applied to FOQA data have been (a) the parameter 
exceedance analysis, or event detection, and (b) statistical analysis, or routine flight data 
measurement (2004). There has also been some usage of FOQA data for incident 
investigation. 
The parameter exceedance analysis or event detection has involved examination 
for aircraft-parameters beyond predetermined thresholds in a specific occurrence, or a 
programmed event, during various phases of flight. For example, a GDRAS event could 
be programmed to detect each time the aircraft bank angle (the parameter analyzed) 
exceeded 35 degrees, as displayed in Figure 4. These data could be trended over multiple 
flights to determine the number of abnormal events occurring per flight segment. In 
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addition, the data could be trended to determine phase of flight, airport, or runway, if 
appropriate, depending on the event type. Levels of exceedance have been programmed 
for particular events, based on the operator's risk assessment, to assist in focusing 
resources on corrective action in the highest perceived operational risk area(s) (FAA, 
2004). 
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Figure 4. Parameter Exceedance Analysis, or Event Detection, of Bank Angle Greater 
than 35 Degrees. 
Statistical analysis, or routine flight data measurement, has been used to create 
flight profiles. The profiles have used several measurements to build distributions of 
various criterion parameters. The distributions of data have shown all flights and enabled 
a carrier to determine risk based on the means and the standard deviations. One area of 
flight operations carriers have analyzed has been final approach tracks. A profile has 
typically been designed to measure the different criteria of an approach. Parameters 
involved have been airspeed, rate of descent, configuration, and power setting. For 
example, the GDRAS has captured the maximum airspeed of every flight on final 
approach. The distributions "painted a picture" of the performance of each flight. The 
carrier was then able to determine when an approach track resulted in an unstable 
approach or landing (FAA, 2004). 
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Similar to parameter exceedance analysis, routine flight data measurement has 
utilized data distributions to "drill down" and examine the phase of flight (as displayed in 
Figure 5), the airport, or the aircraft type. The value of using statistical analysis has been 
that data from all flights have been used to determine risk for an airline without focusing 
on specific event exceedances. The use of data distributions has developed a risk 
assessment process by establishing a baseline for trending data and determining critical 
safety concerns. Statistical analysis has been a means to determine the total performance 
of an airline's operation and root causes of systemic problems (FAA, 2004). 
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Figure 5. Routine Flight Data Measurement Utilizing a Distribution for a Phase of Flight 
- Final Approach at 500 Feet (Adapted from S. Wellington). 
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In summary, FOQA personnel utilizing GDRAS have extracted abnormal events, 
or exceedances, and routine operational measurements. Ultimately, these analyses were 
presented to those airline departments (stakeholders) that were recipients of the safety 
improvements and continued airworthiness benefits (CAA, 2003). Features of the 
GDRAS have enabled the FOQA analysts to present elaborate operational reports and 
flight animations. Details of the cyclical nature of the FOQA process have been 
illustrated in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. The FOQA Cyclical Process (Adapted from S. Wellington). 
The entire FOQA process has been characterized by confidentiality. The flight 
crewmember identity has been removed from view (de-identified) in the electronic record 
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as part of the initial processing of the airborne data. However, a gatekeeper, charged with 
the primary responsibility for the security of the identified data, has been able to link 
FOQA data to an individual flight or crewmember. This capability has been provided "for 
a limited period of time, in order to enable follow-up inquiry with the specific flight crew 
associated with a particular FOQA event" (FAA, 2004, p. 8). Gatekeeper identification of 
the flight and/or the crewmembers has been limited to situations where further insight 
into the circumstances surrounding an event was needed. 
Helicopters 
Rotorcraft have participated in a broad variety of aviation activities in our society. 
These activities have included not only the day-to-day routine helicopter transportation, 
but also those in support of relief efforts during emergency situations. The non-helicopter 
community could clearly perceive the importance of helicopter deployment during the 
catastrophes of September 11, 2001, the December 26, 2004 tsunami, Hurricane Katrina 
on August 29, 2005, and the Pakistan earthquake on October 8, 2005. 
Approximately 265 representatives from the helicopter manufacturing industry, 
the military and civil operators, and the international regulatory communities attended the 
International Helicopter Safety Symposium (IHSS) 2005 in Montreal, Canada. The 
purpose of the meeting was to discuss the need for an international collaborative effort to 
reduce both civil and military accidents in the vertical flight industry. The two most 
significant achievements of IHSS 2005 were acknowledgment by all participants that the 
helicopter accident rate had been excessive and unsustainable, and the collaborative effort 
by all should be able to reduce that rate by 80% (Stevens & Sheffield, 2006). 
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A comparison among accident rates of different types of operations throughout 
the aviation industry provided a glance of the current risk involved in helicopter 
operations. Figure 7 has displayed accident rates used as benchmarks by the aviation 
industry. Although comparisons based only on accident rate calculations have not 
provided the most accurate picture (Wood, 2003), they have been sufficient to motivate 
efforts toward improved helicopter operation safety. In order to obtain a better overview 
of the current helicopter world, EMS, sightseeing, and offshore operations were 
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Figure 7. Representative Accident Rates per 100,000 Flight Hours (Adapted from HAI, 
2006; IHST, 2006a; and NTSB, 2006a). 
separated, and some safety-related data were stated for each type of operation, 
considering their differences in equipment, mission, and/or environment. 
EMS 
In January 2006, the NTSB released a Special Investigation Report on EMS 
Operations. It stated that between January 2002 and January 2005, 41 EMS helicopter 
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accidents occurred in the U.S., 16 of which were fatal, resulting in a total of 39 fatalities 
and 13 serious injuries - numbers that had not been seen since the 1980s (NTSB, 2006d). 
The number of hours flown by EMS helicopter operations has increased 
substantially over the years. For example, EMS helicopters flew about 162,000 flight 
hours in 1991 and an estimated 300,000 flight hours in 2005. Due to the increased 
number of hours flown, with the accident rate per flight hours over the years having 
remained a constant, the absolute number of accidents would be increased by 
approximately 85%. However, the average accident rate has also increased from 3.53 
accidents per 100,000 flight hours between 1992 and 2001 to 4.56 accidents per 100,000 
flight hours between 1997 and 2001. The absolute number of real accidents has become 
an incredible statistic. The numbers of EMS aircraft (helicopters and airplanes) accidents 
for the 15-year period from 1990 to 2005 has been displayed in Figure 8. 
As a result, the NTSB investigated a group of EMS accidents in detail and 
identified recurring safety issues. These issues included "lack of aviation flight risk 
evaluation programs for EMS operations" and "no requirements to use technologies such 
as terrain awareness and warning systems (TAWS) to enhance EMS flight safety" 
(NTSB, 2006d, p. vii). The NTSB (2006d) also claimed that despite the FAA's positive 
steps to improve EMS operational safety, the FAA has not yet imposed any requirements 
for all EMS aircraft operators concerning risk management, or the use of current 
technologies. "Although the Board recognizes that the nature of EMS operations involves 
some risks, operators should be required to provide the best available tools to minimize 
those risks and help medical personnel, flight crews, and patients arrive at their 
destinations safely" (p. xi). 
Total Injuries 
Year 
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1991 
1992 
1993 
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2000 
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2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Number of 
accidents 
1 
1 
3 
3 
4 
5 
5 
3 
11 
6 
6 
13 
13 
19 
19 
13 
Number of fatal 
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0 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
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1 
2 
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1 
6 
3 
9 
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Figure 8. EMS Aircraft (Helicopters and Airplanes) Accidents for the 15-Year Period 
from 1990 to 2005 (Adapted from NTSB, 2006d). 
Sightseeing Helicopter Flight 
The occurrence of accidents in the sightseeing-flight community has been of 
similar concern: 
The N.T.S.B. has recorded more than 140 sightseeing-flight accidents nationally 
since January 2000, 19 of them fatal. The accidents were split almost evenly 
among helicopters, balloons and small planes, but helicopter flights made up more 
than half of the fatal crashes, killing 43 people, 24 in Hawaii. (Klein, 2006, p. 1) 
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This high rate of accidents prompted the FAA to begin formulating regulations 
called the National Air Tour Safety Standards in October 2003. The proposed rules have 
required operators to equip their aircraft with floats and passengers to wear uninflated life 
vests before flights over water. The regulations have been expected to be finalized in the 
summer of 2006. However, organizations such as Tour Operators Program of Safety 
(TOPS) and Alaska's 5-year-old Medallion Foundation have recognized that operating 
beyond the proposed regulations has been determined as prudent, as well as more 
attention to the human factor in accidents. 
Klein (2006) aggregated expert information on sightseeing industry safety and 
some industry initiatives implemented in order to improve safety. The FAA and 
insurance companies claimed that "the aircraft were only a small part of the problem, and 
that poor decisions by tour companies and their pilots - often involving weather - caused 
most helicopter accidents" (p. 2). In Alaska, officials have credited Capstone, an FAA 
program designed to improve safety through better terrain mapping and weather 
technology, with reducing aviation accident rates; the last air tour fatality in the state was 
in May 2003. Las Vegas-based Sundance Helicopters, on the other hand, after a 7-
passenger fatality in the Grand Canyon in 2003 began placing unannounced check pilots 
on flights. These audits were designed to monitor the flights and report on discrepancies 
(e.g., the pilot flew below 500 feet or exceeded the prescribed bank angle [Klein, 2006]). 
Offshore Helicopter Operations 
The helicopter safety performance data for the offshore oil industry segment has 
been the most complete and believed to be the most accurate statistically. The OGP 
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(2006) has computed these data based on submissions from helicopter operators 
worldwide. The resulting statistics have provided a reference for the oil industry to 
remain on the OGP helicopter safety goal track. The OGP target has been that "the 
individual risk per period of flying exposure for an individual flying on OGP-contracted 
business should be no greater than on the average global airline" (Stevens & Sheffield, 
2006, p. 28). 
The 2004 number of offshore helicopter flights associated with all types of 
activity (offshore, seismic, geophysical, pipeline, and others) was 2.5 million, and the 
number of passengers transported was 8.5 million. A total of 20 helicopter accidents were 
reported, with 26 fatalities. These numbers resulted in 2.05 accidents per 100,000 flight 
hours or 0.80 per 100,000 flight stages (OGP, 2006). Stevens & Sheffield (2006) noted 
that achieving the OGP safety goal could save more than 200 offshore oil and gas 
workers' lives during the next 10 years. 
The two biggest offshore regions for helicopter operation have been the North Sea 
and the Gulf of Mexico. The North Sea helicopter transportation has been required to 
serve large offshore platforms located at great distances from shore. 
Gulf of Mexico helicopter operations have historically been rather different. The 
majority of the offshore installations are located quite close to shore, and many 
services are performed using small single engine helicopters, some of which are 
not required to be fitted with emergency flotation equipment. (Rowe & Howson, 
2005, p. 1) 
Another contrast has been that the FAA has permitted exemptions or exceptions to the 
flight recorder regulations that allow transport-category rotorcraft, like some helicopters 
in operation in the Gulf of Mexico, to operate without flight recorders (NTSB, 2006b). 
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Although the Gulf of Mexico's weather climate has been relatively benign, the 
requirement to evacuate the platforms in advance of a hurricane, for example, would 
result in operations similar to those in the North Sea. Moreover, "with the development of 
the Gulf of Mexico's ultra-deep-water fields, the helicopter operations to these new 
platforms are becoming more akin to North Sea operations" (Rowe & Howson, 2005, p. 
1). 
The largest part of North Sea helicopter operations has been represented by the 
UKCS with an average of 90,000 flight hours of the total 130,033 hours flown in the 
entire North Sea region during 2004. Rowe & Howson (2005) summarized the safety 
performance of UKCS and North Sea operations over the years as follows. Since 1976, 
12 fatal helicopter accidents associated with UKCS offshore operations have occurred; 
118 lives have been lost since then. The North Sea offshore helicopter fleet experienced 
no accidents in the last 2 years for which statistics were available (2003 and 2004). The 
last fatal accident occurred in 2002 resulting in 11 fatalities. Previously, there had not 
been a fatal offshore accident since 1992. In 2004 the 5-year moving average total 
accident rate was 0.77 per 100,000 flying hours, and the fatal accident rate was 0.13 per 
100,000 flying hours (OGP, 2006; Rowe & Howson, 2005). 
Williams (2006) of the HSAC, in line with the Conference philosophy of sharing 
information with all operators to provoke safety initiatives, presented a relevant overview 
of Gulf of Mexico helicopter operations that was a representative sample of worldwide 
operations. 
The 2005 Gulf of Mexico oil industry helicopter accident rate per 100,000 flight 
hours was 2.05 with a total of 8 accidents (6 single engine, 1 each light and 
medium twin) compared to a 22-year annual average accident rate of 1.89. The 
fatal accident rate per 100,000 flight hours during 2005 was 0.51 with a total of 2 
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fatal accidents (5 fatalities) compared to a 22-year average of 0.74. During 2005, 
improper pilot procedures and technical fault each accounted for 3 (32%) or 6 of 
the 8 accidents. The additional accidents causes were 1 unknown and 1 related to 
fuel quality control. In the last 5 years, there have been 47 accidents of which 15 
were fatal (32%), resulting in 34 fatalities and 42 injuries. 23 (49%) of these 
accidents were due to pilot procedure related causes, 13 (28%) were due to 
technical fault, and the remaining accidents due other mixed factors. For technical 
accidents, there were 9 engine related events, 2 tail rotor events, and 2 for other 
technical causes. 13 of the 47 accidents (28%) were related to events around the 
helideck (5 obstacle strikes, 4 loss of control, 2 passenger control, and 1 each 
approach procedure / tie-down removal). The specific leading causes of accidents 
in the last 5 years have been: (a) 9 (19%) engine related and 9 loss of control with 
3 fatalities in each category (6 total); (b) 4 (9%) controlled flight into terrain or 
water - with 7 fatalities, 4 helideck obstacle strikes with 4 fatalities, and 4 fuel 
quality control; (c) 3 (6%) loose cargo striking tail rotor; and (d) 3 (6%) unknown 
causes with 14 fatalities (1 night with 10 fatalities). Note - Although night flight 
accounts for less than 3% of the GoM [Gulf of Mexico] flight hours, in the last 
five years, the 3 night accidents accounted for 7% of the total accidents and 32%) 
of total fatalities (11 of 34 total). 2 of the 3 events were fatal. fl[ 2-5) 
Table 2 has summarized the operational data from the North Sea, the Gulf of 
Mexico, and other worldwide-regions offshore helicopter operations. The salient number 
of Gulf of Mexico single engine helicopters has been highlighted. Figure 9 has displayed 
5-year accident rates for the same 2004 descriptives. It can be noticed that "the Gulf of 
Table 2 
2004 Worldwide Offshore Helicopter Operational Data Summary, with Number of 
Helicopters by Type (Adapted from OGP, 2006) 
Single Light Medium Heavy Total Passengers Hours Number 
engine twin twin twin fleet carried flown of flights 
r r 387 60 100 14 Mex 
Other 46 20 300 63 
Total 433 80 431 146 
100 1,826,522 130,033 232,104 
561 2,329,064 361,514 1,620,621 
428 4,031,790 361,942 440,152 
1,089 8,187,376 853,489 2,292,876 
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Mexico accident rate has become significantly higher than that in the North Sea, and this 
trend is somewhat surprising in view of the generally benign weather environment in the 
region" (Rowe & Howson, 2005, p. 1). 
• Gulf of Mexic 
• Worldwide 
• North Sea 
# Fatal # Fatal per 1M # Accidents per 
100k hours Accidents per occupants 100k flights 
100k hours 
Figure 9. 2004 5-year Average Offshore Accident Rates (Adapted from OGP, 2006). 
Attitudes toward Helicopter Safety 
The HAI and the AHS, with a consortium of operators, manufacturers, and 
government regulatory agencies, announced the creation of the IHST in 2006. The 
commitment of all industry representatives was to work together in the voluntary 
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST)-like environment crafted specifically for the 
rotorcraft community to achieve a reduction in the accident rate by 80% in 2016. The 
committee considered this goal to be challenging, but achievable (IHST, 2006b). 
Shell's helicopter risk-reduction program has also had the goal of reducing the 
accident rate of their contracted-helicopter operations by 80% or more. The program has 
been named "7 / 7 = 1"; translated to "reduce the current fatal-accident rate for offshore 
helicopter operations from just under seven per million flight hours to around one per 
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million flight hours" (Stevens & Sheffield, 2006, p. 28). (Additionally, seven key 
measures have been advocated for the program.) Globally, the reduction goal has been 
consistent with both the OGP and IHST goals; Shell's analysis showed that: 
To achieve a fatal-accident rate of one per million flight hours or less, industry 
must re-equip with helicopters designed to the latest requirements in Federal 
Aviation Regulations (FAR) 27 (for small aircraft) and 29 (for large ones). . . . 
Together with the established risk-reduction potential of simulator training, 
quality and safety management systems, HUMS [Health Usage and Monitoring 
Systems], HOMP, disciplined takeoff and landing profiles and defensive 
equipment like EGPWS [Enhanced Ground-Proximity Warning System] and 
TCAS [Traffic Alert Collision Avoidance System], our assessment showed that 
helicopters designed to the latest standards can indeed achieve the goal of 
reducing the fatal-accident rate by 80 percent or more. (Stevens & Sheffield, 
2006, p. 30) 
The NTSB has recently recommended to the FAA that: 
1. All U.S.-registered turbine-powered helicopters certificated to carry at least 6 
passengers to be equipped with a Terrain Awareness and Warning System 
(TAWS; NTSB, 2006c). 
2. All rotorcraft operating under 14 CFR Parts 91 and 135 with a transport-
category certification to be equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and 
(FDR). Furthermore, "do not permit exemptions or exceptions to the flight 
recorder regulations that allow transport-category rotorcraft to operate without 
flight recorders, and withdraw the current exemptions and exceptions that 
allow transport-category rotorcraft to operate without flight recorders" 
(NTSB, 2006b, p. 9). 
Before the current, aforementioned initiatives, offshore helicopter stakeholders 
had always been challenged to improve safety. The improvement of North Sea offshore 
helicopter operational safety has been revealing. The CAA, with the collaboration of 
other North Sea industry participants, experienced disappointing safety records for 
helicopters in the 1970s and early 1980s. This led to the formation of the Helicopter 
Airworthiness Review Panel (HARP). Among this group's 1984 findings were 
recommendations for research into helicopter health and usage monitoring, 
crashworthiness, and ditching. The HARP Report also called for an investigation of 
human factors-related accidents which led to the formation of the Helicopter Human 
Factors Working Group. This group reported its findings in 1987, which included 
recommendations for research into an additional seven, mainly operational, areas of 
concern (Howson, 2005). 
In addition to HARP and the human factors group, a major review of offshore 
safety and survival was commissioned in 1993 in response to a UK Air Accidents 
Investigation Branch (AAIB) recommendation following the fatal accident at the 
Cormorant A oil rig in 1992. This study was conducted by the Review of Helicopter 
Offshore Safety and Survival working group, which reported its findings in 1995. The 
three joint initiatives by the CAA, the AAIB, and the industry formed the basis for the 
majority of the offshore helicopter safety research programs (Howson, 2005). The 
coherently developed research programs have contributed to remarkably improved safety 
in the helicopter operations in the North Sea region. 
A review of accidents and their causes from 1976 through 2002 provided solid 
evidence of post-1994 improvement. The study analyzed the UKCS accident statistics by 
splitting the period 1976 to 2002 into three 9-year periods. A good measure of the level 
of improvement during the period 1994 to 2002 was the (highlighted in Table 3) 
reduction in the non-fatal accidents rates (both in terms of flying hours and sectors) from 
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the previous two periods. This appeared to be largely due to the reduction in the number 
of technical failures since 1993. Part of this improvement could "be attributed to the 
introduction of Health Usage and Monitoring Systems (HUMS) on UK offshore 
helicopters from 1992" (John Burt Associates Limited/Bomel Limited, 2004, p. 24). 
Table 3 
Fatal and Non-Fatal Reportable Accident Rates in UKCS 1976-2002 
Per 100,000 Flying Hours Per 100,000 Sectors (Flight 
Stages) 
Period Occupant Fatal Accident Rate 
Non-Fatal 
Reportable 
Accident Rate 
Occupant Fatal 
Accident Rate 
Non-Fatal 
Reportable 
Accident Rate 
1976-1984 1.68 2.24 0.81 1.08 
1985-1993 6.18 2.19 2.52 0.89 
1994-2002 1.34 0.98 0.61 0,44 
1976-2002 3.24 1.84 1.44 0.82 
Strategies to deal with both technical failures and pilot-related accidents have 
emerged. One way in which helicopter technical issues have been addressed has been by 
the introduction of HUMS equipment (Hart, 2005). HUMS has comprised a combination 
of sensors, data acquisition technology, and software algorithms, both on board and 
ground-based. This system has been used to monitor helicopter vibration to help detect 
mechanical failures, which can reduce maintenance costs and improve safety (NTSB, 
2006b). Alternatively, HOMP, or FOQA for helicopters, was originally tried by the CAA 
in 1999 to impact pilot-related accident causes. 
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Shell's studies provided an estimated effectiveness of FOQA for helicopters as a 
mitigation measure to reduce accident rates. Based on the common causes of helicopter 
accidents, the study concluded that FOQA had the potential to prevent about 15-17% of 
helicopter accidents (Stevens & Sheffield, 2006). FOQA for helicopters has been "one of 
the more exciting recent developments in improving the management of helicopter risk" 
(Hart, 2005, p. 5). 
The HOMP Trial and Its Two Reports 
In 1999, the CAA initiated trials of FOQA for North Sea helicopters, known as 
HOMP - the Helicopter Operations Monitoring Programme. The final reports on HOMP 
trial were published in 2002 and 2004. The trials involved two different offshore 
helicopter operators and two types of helicopters: AS322L Super Puma and Sikorsky 
S76. The results were considered successful: "In March 2004, the ICAO Helicopter 
Tiltrotor Study Group (HTSG) unanimously agreed to propose to add HOMP to ICAO 
Annex 6 Part III as a Recommended Practice for flight data recorder-equipped 
helicopters" (CAA, 2004, p. vi). 
The HOMP's data had been acquired and transferred; the data were then analyzed 
in a manner that paralleled that of a GDRAS processing fixed-wing FOQA data. The data 
analysis performed by the HOMP software included event detection and routine flight 
data measurements. The CAA (2004) described the HOMP software (depicted in Figure 
10, preceding the hypothesis), consisting of three integrated modules, as follows: 
1. The Flight Data Traces (FDT) module reads in flight data from the CQAR, 
detects pre-[s7c]defined events and extracts a set of flight data measurements. 
The events are stored together with their associated flight data and can be 
analysed by viewing event traces and flight data simulations (FDS) from 
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within the module. Validated events and flight data measurements are 
exported to the other two modules. FDT has been designed to be user-
configurable to allow events and measurements to be modified or added 
without the involvement of the software provider. This is important for 
filtering out any regular nuisance events. 
2. The Flight Data Events (FDE) module stores the validated events generated 
by FDT which can be collectively analysed to determine trends in their 
frequency of occurrence or severity by location, operating base, pilot code, 
flight phase etc. Event severity values are allocated in FDT or FDE and, by 
performing a trend analysis of cumulative event severities, FDE provides an 
effective risk management tool. FDE has an optional link to the BASIS ASR 
[British Airways Safety Information System Air Safety Report] module which 
allows any air safety report information associated with a flight data event to 
be viewed. This enhances the tracking and management of overall safety 
performance. Also, individual events stored within FDE can be further 
analysed using a facility known as FDV (Flight Data Visualisation). This 
enables event traces to be analysed and flight data simulations to be run from 
within the FDE module itself 
3. The Flight Data Measurements (FDM) module also stores information 
generated by FDT but is not event based. This information is the collection of 
many flight data measurements for every single flight; e.g. maximum roll 
angle, height at gear retraction, estimated wind speed and direction at landing. 
Once in FDM this data can be usefully analysed in many different ways (by 
location, time period, aircraft registration etc.) to make comparisons and help 
to better understand normal operation in relation to problems identified in 
FDE. The module is also useftil for determining realistic and effective event 
limits for FDT. (Section 1, pp. 2-3) 
A set of HOMP flight phases (CAA, 2002) had been established, as follows: (a) 
on the ground (prior to takeoff), (b) takeoff, (c) cruise, (d) landing, and (e) on the ground 
(after landing). The set of HOMP events and a set of measurements have been described 
in Appendixes A and B. Two identical recommendations from the two reports were to: 
1. Continue to develop and refine the HOMP events to maximise the safety 
benefits of the programme, and optimise the balance between detecting the 
widest possible range of operational risks and minimising the nuisance event 
rate. 
2. Continue to develop and refine the HOMP measurements to maximise their 
accuracy in characterising different aspects of the operation and to provide 
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further analysis capabilities. (CAA, 2002, Section 11, p. 1; CAA, 2004, 
Section 8, p. 1) 
Figure 10. The HOMP System (Adapted from CAA, 2004). 
The Research Hypothesis 
The review of literature and the empirical HOMP studies has led to the hypothesis 
that flight phases, events, and measurements of the helicopter FOQA analysis software 
can be refined and/or developed to (a) characterize different aspects of helicopter 
operations, (b) detect a wider possible range of operational risks, and (c) provide further 
analysis capabilities. This working hypothesis has not led to deductive reasoning 
invoking null hypothesis testing. 
Chapter III 
METHODOLOGY 
This study was developed during an internship with a FOQA supplier during the 
fall of 2005. The highly experienced FOQA vendor had been transferring FOQA know-
how from the field of fixed-wing aircraft to the helicopter environment. The author, a 
helicopter pilot with expertise in air naval operations, and possessing limited linear 
programming skills, had been involved with FOQA concepts in academe. The partnering 
was planned as integral to the internship and provided the foundation for a research plan 
with three objectives. The plan was to develop a helicopter FOQA (HFOQA) version, 
while defining, programming, and refining the following three elements (project 
objectives) of the HFOQA analysis software: 
1. Flight phases: The flight phases had to (a) represent the different 
characteristics of a helicopter flight, (b) be able to correspond to the actual 
flight state of the helicopter, and (c) cover a wider range of flight profiles, 
independently of helicopter model capabilities, or its mission. 
2. Events: The events had to (a) detect a wider possible range of operational 
risks, (b) trigger a minimal number of false exceedances, and (c) allow, if 
possible, association between the event detected and the origin or destination 
of the flight. 
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3. Measurements: The measurements had to provide (a) accurate operational 
profiles without the preexamination of events in individual flights and (b) the 
maximum number of analysis capabilities. 
Research Design 
The three aforementioned objectives demanded actions and real world, practice-
oriented solutions. Thus, the project became a problem-centered study; "instead of 
methods being important, the problem is most important" (Creswell, 2003, p. 5). There 
was a concern with application - "what works" (Creswell, p. 5). The use of "pluralistic 
approaches to derive knowledge about the problem" (Creswell, p. 6) was the 
philosophical underpinning. The three project objectives brought general philosophical 
ideas or "knowledge claims" (Creswell, p. 5) of pragmatism, which oriented the research 
to the use of a mixed methods framework. 
Mixed Methods 
Mixed methods could be defined as the research approach that has focused "on 
collecting and analyzing both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study . . . to 
converge or confirm findings from different data sources" (Creswell, 2003, p. 210). 
Because mixed methods research has been relatively new as an individual research 
strategy in the social sciences, Creswell encouraged that a basic description be presented. 
This author offered a concise report of the method and its evolvement: 
Less well known than either the quantitative or qualitative strategies are those that 
involve collecting and analyzing both forms of data in a single study. The concept 
of mixing different methods probably originated in 1959, when Campbell and 
Fiske used multiple methods to study validity of psychological traits. They 
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encouraged others to employ their "multimethod matrix" to examine multiple 
approaches to data collection in a study. This prompted others to mix methods, 
and soon approaches associated with field methods such as observations and 
interviews (qualitative data) were combined with traditional surveys (quantitative 
data) (S. D. Sieber, 1973). Recognizing that all methods have limitations, 
researchers felt that biases inherent in any single method could neutralize or 
cancel the biases of other methods. Triangulating data sources - a means for 
seeking convergence across qualitative and quantitative methods - were born 
(Jick, 1979). From the original concept of triangulation emerged additional 
reasons for mixing different types of data. For example, the results from one 
method can help develop or inform the other method (Greene, Caracelli, & 
Graham, 1989). Alternatively, one method can be nested within another method to 
provide insight into different levels or units of analysis (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 
1998). . . . These reasons for mixing methods have led writers from around the 
world to develop procedures for mixed methods strategies of inquiry and to take 
the numerous terms found in the literature, such as multimethod, convergence, 
integrated, and combined (Creswell, 1994) and shape procedures for research 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). (pp. 15-16) 
Data Collection 
The data collection strategy utilized in this mixed methods approach was known 
as Concurrent Procedures. The collection of both the qualitative data and the quantitative 
data occurred at the same time (concurrently) in the research process. No greater priority 
or weight was given to a specific type of data; the qualitative and quantitative information 
were equally treated. The two types of data were integrated during the analysis and 
interpretation stages of the study; no overall theoretical perspective guided this strategy 
(Creswell, 2003). 
The data originated from different sources. The qualitative data sources were 
represented by a helicopter pilot (the author), FOQA specialists and programmers, and an 
offshore helicopter operator chief pilot. The quantitative data sources were helicopter 
FDAUs. The selected sources were chosen to concurrently gather subjective data from a 
high level of expertise with accurate, objective data to incorporate and cross-validate all 
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aspects of HFOQA programming. All data collection was oriented to achieve the real 
world solution for the HFOQA development. 
The author was the main source of helicopter expertise as well as the computer 
programmer. Subjective helicopter expertise was applied throughout the programming 
process (e.g., knowledge of how the in-flight helicopter behavior was translated into 
parameter indications). Company FOQA specialists and programmers were consulted for 
data concepts pertaining to FOQA know-how or programming expertise (i.e., when, 
during the programming process, the author was unable to code information into the 
HFOQA software programming language). Information from the offshore helicopter 
operator's chief pilot encompassed the limit values of parameters, or sensitive issues 
regarding established SOPs. 
The quantitative data retrieved from helicopter FDAUs were de-identified digital 
flight data. This objective information confirmed (corroborating or contradicting) the 
linear programming. Extensive reliance upon the digital flight data was employed during 
the analysis and interpretation process of the study. A total of 1,014 flights with different 
origins and destinations comprised the quantitative data set. Table 4 has displayed an 
overview of the research design utilized. 
Data Analysis, Interpretation, and Validity 
The author was primary trained to work with the HFOQA GDRAS and its 
programming language for 2 weeks. This GDRAS has been used by fixed-wing 
community with FOQA, included several major U.S. and worldwide airlines; it has been 
considered as one of the most capable in terms of functionality and processing (Wu, 
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2005). The combination of the GDRAS intuitive interface, together with its practical 
environment, allowed the author to gain knowledge of HFOQA programming techniques 
in a short amount of time. 
Table 4 
Research Design (Adaptedfrom Creswell, 2003) 
Mixed Methods Framework Elements 
1. Knowledge Claims Pragmatic Assumptions 
2. Strategies of Inquiry Concurrent Procedures 
3. Qualitative Data Sources Helicopter and FOQA Experts 
4. Quantitative Data Sources Flight Data Acquisition Units (FDAUs) 
5. Data Priority Equal 
6. Data Integration At Data Analysis 
7. Theoretical Perspective Implicit 
Accordingly, the programming stage of the study was divided into the established 
project objectives. The first 4 weeks of the stage were dedicated to work on the definition 
of the HFOQA flight phases. Upon completing and validating the definitions of the flight 
phases, the next 4 weeks were committed to the creation and refinement of the HFOQA 
events. Finally, the last 4 weeks of the study were devoted to the development of 
HFOQA measurements and statistical reports. (Table 5 has illustrated the study's overall 
timeline.) 
Definition of HFOQA Flight Phases 
The HFOQA GDRAS contained several modules, including one for event 
detection and another for statistical reports. However, before finding events or assessing 
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Table 5 
HFOQA Study's Overall Timeline 
Task 1st Step 2nd Step 3rd Step Duration 
1. HFOQA 
Programming 
Language Training 
2. Definition of 
Flight Phases 
3. Definition of 
Events 
Selection of Selection of 
relevant helicopter parameters for 
flight segments usage in 
composing the 
program 
Selection of Selection of 
operational events maintenance 
events 
Programming 
4. Definition of Program HFOQA Creation of safety/ 
Measurements and to store parameters efficiency 
Statistical Reports of all flights in its operational 
maximum, or 
minimum 
conditions 
Programming and 
establishment of 
severity levels 
Programming of 
standard statistical 
reports 
procedures; 
program HFOQA 
to store related 
parameter values 
2 Weeks 
4 Weeks 
4 Weeks 
4 Weeks 
operational statistics, the HFOQA GDRAS had to recognize and correctly represent 
helicopter flights. The helicopter flight phases programming stage was vital; flight phases 
were to provide the logic for the helicopter's flight behavior with respect to its regime 
and location for all other HFOQA features and modules. For example, the importance of 
well-defined flight phases became decisive during the analysis process of a detected 
event in a given location of the helicopter flight path. The occurrence of a specified bank 
angle exceedance, whether identified in a cruise flight phase above 500 ft, or during the 
takeoff close to the terrain, resulted in totally different concerns and mitigation actions. 
The first step of the flight phase definition and programming was to segregate a 
typical helicopter flight path into singular and unique pieces/segments; for example, (a) 
on the ground, (b) taxiing, (c) hovering, (d) climbing, (e) cruising, and (f) landing. These 
47 
segments had to accurately correspond to significant helicopter flight characteristics 
during the period beginning with the preflight (commencing when the aircraft has 
initially been electrically powered) through the helicopter "engine shutdown." These 
selected pieces of flight became the flight phases to be programmed. 
Having chosen the relevant segments of a helicopter flight path (flight phases) to 
be programmed, the second step was to comprehend and decide upon the recorded and/or 
software-calculated helicopter parameters for usage in composing the program. These 
parameters needed to have values that varied remarkably and according to the flight 
phase changes. The parameters were to trigger a flight phase start and end in the 
programming stage. 
The programming stage of the selected helicopter flight phases was the third step. 
The HFOQA flight phase programming encompassed assembling the conspicuous 
parameters with the flight phase concepts in the HFOQA GDRAS language. Throughout 
the process, the digital flight data were used to verify the effectiveness and accuracy of 
the computer-generated flight phases. Following the programming stage, validation of the 
HFOQA flight phases definition was conducted through peer examination by FOQA 
specialists and programmers. 
Definition of HFOQA Events 
As the 7th week of the study commenced, the definition and programming of 
HFOQA events became necessary. The project dictated that both operational and 
maintenance risks must be detected by HFOQA. All parameters in a specific flight profile 
that could affect flight safety, efficiency, or SOPs needed to be monitored for 
exceedances. Consequently, it was decided that three levels of severity would be 
established for each of the monitored parameters. 
The first step of the events programming was to define the events to be 
programmed. For the operational events, the HOMP trial events (Appendix A) were used 
as the basis. Events from HOMP were selected that, having been programmed, could 
have their effectiveness verified by the available flight data. New operational events, 
based on safety, efficiency, and the operator's SOPs, were also established. Definition of 
the maintenance events was directed by the helicopter maintenance manual. 
The programming process occurred as the second step and concurrently with the 
establishment of severity levels for each event. The events were programmed in a manner 
to probe deeper than the event detection, thereby allowing for any future correlations 
between the detected event and the flight origin or destination, where applicable. Three 
severity levels and their respective limits were assigned for each event: level 1 for low 
severity, level 2 for medium severity, and level 3 for high severity. The quantitative flight 
data were used to verify if events that occurred were actually detected, and if the 
established limits for the severity levels were appropriate. Descriptive plots (e.g., 
normality of distribution) of the flight data were also generated as a reasonable check of 
the event detections and their assigned limit levels. 
The validity check of the events definition was, once again, conducted via peer 
examination by FOQA specialists and programmers. The determined event limits for 
each severity level were also peer-validated by the aforementioned offshore helicopter 
operator's chief pilot. Furthermore, the overall event detection capability was validated 
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through generated flight data from a specific real world test flight designed for that 
purpose. 
Definition of HFOQA Measurements 
The GDRAS used in this study allowed both measurements and/or a choice of 
statistical analysis procedures. The analysis capabilities permitted the GDRAS to offer 
overviews of distinct characteristics of flight operations. Correlations between the 
behaviors of different parameters during any desired flight profile, or specific destination 
(e.g., absent the preexamination of individual flight events), were possible. Specifically, a 
FOQA analyst could view the distribution of maximum speed values as a measure (e.g., 
during the approach flight phase to a given airport) in a plot with outliers and/or other 
relevant descriptive statistics (the mean, the standard deviation, etc.). Thus, the core 
strategy of this portion of the study was to actualize those statistical analysis capabilities 
for helicopter parameters and the created flight phases, while developing standard 
statistical reports for the HFOQA GDRAS. 
The first step was to program the HFOQA GDRAS to store each operational or 
maintenance parameter (pertinent to prior programmed events) for all flights in its 
maximum, or minimum, condition. In addition to those event-related measurements, the 
second necessary step was to create and program the measurement of specific safety/ 
efficiency operational procedures as additional, distinct features. For example, a FOQA 
analyst would be able to evaluate how much time a helicopter typically endured between 
arriving at the offshore rig and completing the landing. 
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In completing the HFOQA statistical module, a set of standard statistical reports 
was made available to the HFOQA analyst. The programmed set included reports of the 
two types of measurements - those related to events and those that were specific safety/ 
efficiency operational procedures. 
The real world flight data were used throughout the programming process to 
verify the utility, the functionality, and the concinnity of the statistical reports created. 
The validity check of the HFOQA statistical reports was addressed with peer examination 
by FOQA specialists and programmers. Some of the created measurements for the safety/ 
efficiency procedures were validated by real world flight data from the aforementioned 
test flight. The results of the methods employed in developing the HFOQA software have 
been presented in Chapter IV. 
Chapter IV 
RESULTS 
The working hypothesis that HFOQA analysis software could be refined and/or 
developed to (a) characterize different aspects of helicopter operations, (b) detect a wider 
possible range of operational risks, and (c) provide further analysis capabilities guided 
the methodology. Mixed methods were utilized to combine digital helicopter flight data 
with (a) the helicopter expertise of the author, (b) shared FOQA knowledge, (c) one 
offshore helicopter operator's SOPs, and (d) aircraft maintenance manual data. The 
development of HFOQA analysis software resulted in the emphasis of HFOQA flight 
phases, HFOQA events, and HFOQA measurements that promised direct application in 
the helicopter industry. 
HFOQA Flight Phases 
The concept behind the flight phase development was to program HFOQA with 
the most extensive spectrum of helicopter flight situations. Consequently, the HFOQA 
software was programmed with recognition and representation capabilities that feasibly 
encompassed the broadest range of helicopter flight profiles. HFOQA thus precisely 
identified and demonstrated what the helicopter was doing at any given moment from the 
preflight (commencing when the aircraft has initially been electrically powered) through 
the helicopter engine shutdown. A total of 17 flight phases were established and 
programmed to accurately cover different helicopter model capabilities and missions. 
51 
52 
Figure 11 has depicted the HFOQA flight phases during a typical helicopter flight 
profile. (Differences in flight phases in comparison to the fixed-wing phases of flight 
have been illustrated.) 
8. Cruise 9. Descent 
HFOQA FLIGHT PHASES 
6. Takeoff 
5. Air Taxi Out 
4. Hover Out 
10. Final Approach 
11. Go Around 
17. Engine Stop 
Figure 11. HFOQA Flight Phases. 
The HFOQA flight phases of Figure 11 have been defined and/or briefly 
explained as follows: 
1. Preflight - A standby flight phase utilized by the software as a reference that 
flight initiation has occurred. 
2. Engine Start - At least one engine has experienced rotation. 
3. Taxi Out - Helicopter has moved on the ground (on its wheels, if equipped) 
before flight. 
4. Hover Out - Helicopter has become airborne, with no speed, before flight. 
5. Air Taxi Out - Helicopter has become airborne (close to the ground), moving 
at a slow speed before flight. This flight phase has been useful to identify the 
53 
taxi of a helicopter with skid/float landing gear and no capability to move on 
the surface on its own wheels. The taxi of this aircraft has occurred after the 
hover flight phase. 
6. Takeoff- The helicopter has departed its origin to accomplish its mission. 
7. Climb - Helicopter has ascended from point A enroute to point B. 
8. Cruise - Helicopter has achieved level flight during transition from point A 
enroute to point B. 
9. Descent - Helicopter has left level flight for arrival at point B. 
10. Final Approach - Helicopter has commenced preparation for landing. 
11. Go Around - Helicopter commenced the final approach; however, for any 
unexpected reason, it was obligated to abort the landing, probably in 
compliance with emergency procedures. 
12. Air Taxi In - Helicopter has completed the arrival, but is in the air (close to 
the ground) moving at a slow speed. This flight phase has been necessitated 
by the taxi of a helicopter with skid/float landing gear and no capability to 
move on the surface on its own wheels. 
13. Hover In - Helicopter has remained airborne after arrival, with no speed. 
14. Landing - Helicopter touch down following arrival. 
15. Touch and Go - After landing, helicopter due to any unexpected reason has 
been obligated to takeoff, probably in compliance with emergency procedures. 
16. Taxi In - Helicopter has moved on the ground (on its wheels), after flight. 
17. Engine Stop - Engines have been shutdown. 
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HFOQA Events 
The event programming stage utilized the HFOQA automatic event detection 
capabilities of the software. A project objective was to detect a wider possible range of 
operational risks, while minimizing false exceedances. Furthermore, both operational and 
maintenance hazards were to be addressed by the developed HFOQA events. 
The study developed 88 HFOQA operational events and 18 maintenance events. 
A real world test flight, designed explicitly for the purpose of detection of some of these 
operational and maintenance events, was flown. (Appendix C has listed the developed 
operational events.) Table 6 has depicted the maintenance event list. 
Table 6 
HFOQA Maintenance Event List 
Maintenance Event Name 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Single Engine Flight 
Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) Monitoring during Engine 
EGT Monitoring during Takeoff 
EGT Monitoring during Flight 
Torque Split 
Torque Sum of Two Engine Flight 
Torque Sum of Two Engine Flight above 104% 
Torque of Single Engine Flight above 127% 
Torque of Single Engine Flight above 135% 
Nl of Two Engine Flight above 100% 
Nl of Single Engine Flight above 101.2% 
Nl of Single Engine Flight above 104.6% 
Nl Maximum Continuous 
Nl Monitoring during Takeoff 
Nl above of the 2 Minutes Limit 
Nl above of the 30 Seconds Limit 
N2 Maximum Exceedance 
N2 Minimum Exceedance 
Start 
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Digital flight data were one of the means for verification and validation of the 
programming utilized throughout the study. Figure 12, for example, has displayed the use 
of objective flight data to verify the accuracy of the event detection and the rationality of 
the established severity level limits. The available flight data represented typical flights 
(i.e., normal flights with no reported incidents). As such, if the established severity level 
limits were sound, the number of levels 2 and 3 events encountered would be smaller 
than the number of level 1 events. This rationale was utilized to refine the preliminary 
limits (assigned for those monitored parameters in conditions with no required SOP 
controls) and prior to the final, decisive word of the offshore helicopter operator's chief 
pilot. Figure 12 has depicted a sample of the aforementioned technique applied during a 
preliminary stage of the study. 
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Figure 12. Event Detection and Severity Level Verification. 
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An example of the use of the quantitative flight data as a validation tool has been 
depicted in Figure 13. A real world test flight was designed to explicitly provide 
maneuvers that would generate exceedances. Each maneuver duplicated a possible real 
flight situation. For example, maneuvers such as (a) go around, (b) split engine torques, 
(c) bird strike avoidance maneuver, (d) orbital patterns, and (e) high speed taxi were 
included in the test flight. The safety boundaries of the test flight were reviewed and 
approved by the operator's flight safety officer. Figure 13 has displayed the test flight 
path in a latitude/longitude (de-identified) plot and included the events detected by 
HFOQA due to the intentionally induced exceedances. 
Figure 13. Event Detection Test Flight. 
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HFOQA Measurements 
The principal goal of the measurements programming process was to enhance the 
previous HFOQA status of exceedance detection software to an operational analysis tool. 
The result was that the software's enhanced statistical capabilities allowed broader 
analysis studies and overviews of the ongoing helicopter operations without any 
preexamination of events in individual flights. 
There were two types of measurement in this HFOQA study. The first type of 
measurement was related to the operational or maintenance parameters that were already 
included in the programmed HFOQA events (see Appendix C and Table 6). Each of 
those parameters was programmed to be measured and stored not only when an 
exceedance occurred, but also during all flights when any of the following occurred: (a) 
the parameter's maximum value, (b) the minimum value, or (c) a specific relevant 
condition. Additionally, helicopter altitude and velocity data at the moment of the 
registered maximum and minimum values were also recorded. 
The second type of measurement created was that associated with other specific 
procedures of safety/efficiency interest. Procedures were developed and programmed to 
measure and store relevant information (aside from those predetermined maximum or 
minimum parameter values of programmed events) of particular safety/efficiency flight 
profiles for future operational comparisons or analyses. These measurements were 
expatiated to address the operational necessities of the offshore helicopter industry. Table 
7 has presented these additional HFOQA measurements. 
Following the measurements, the final, standard statistical reports, either with 
parameter correlations in the appropriate flight profiles or with the safety/efficiency 
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procedures of interest, were developed for the HFOQA statistical report module. Some 
examples of these reports have been presented in Figures 14-16. 
Table 7 
HFOQA Safety/Efficiency Flight Profile Measurements 
Name Definition 
i T^  A x n •> r- /TNx *ry\ Measure and store flight profile data in each takeoff or 1 Dead Man s Curve (DMC) . ,. , 1 ,^ u r * j n ™,n~ landing and compare with the helicopter model s DMC 
2 Rig Landing Measure and store flight profile data during rig landing 
3 Orbit Snapshot Measure and store flight profile data and time if the helicopter executed more than two orbits before landing 
T T , . , , A M x Measure and store helicopter parameters when landed on 
Helideck Movement
 rr, , AJ? / w r * • r 
offshore platform to capture platform movement information. 
Hot Plume Measure and store outside air temperature to detect hot gas flow when landed on the offshore platform 
Figure 14 has displayed a report concerned with the comparison between 
helicopter flight profiles and the helicopter's Dead Man's Curve (DMC) during takeoff 
from offshore platforms and airport runways. The DMC, or height velocity curve, is a 
chart (height on the y-axis and velocity on the x-axis) depicting combinations of airspeed 
and altitude that do not provide sufficient stored energy to permit a safe landing of the 
helicopter in the event of an engine failure (Cantrell, 2006). The risk exposure (for engine 
failure) of helicopters that made takeoffs from airport runways was minimal when 
compared to helicopter departures from offshore platforms. (Blue dots represent the 
actual helicopter flight profiles and their heights and velocities during takeoff; black dots 
represent the DMC.) In theory, helicopters experiencing engine failure inside the curve 
composed by black dots would not be able to recover and fly, or safely recover and land. 
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Height 
Runway Departures 
Height 
•—r 
Velocity 
Platform Departures 
Velocity 
Figure 14. Helicopter Departures and the Dead Man's Curve Report. 
Another HFOQA standard report has been presented in Figure 15. The helicopter 
flight attitude (when flying below 20 ft of altitude) was monitored. The possibility of tail 
strike during operations close to terrain (such as takeoff and landing) was of concern. The 
study demonstrated the maximum pitch-up values in blue and the average heights in red. 
I Number o) values 
r Average Rail 
Figure 15. Maximum Pitch-up below 20 ft versus Height Report. 
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Figure 16 has represented a standard report created to allow assessment of route 
risk in terms of number of events. The number of events per year for each route flown 
(de-identified) has been displayed in a bar graph. 
Number of 
Events 
V\ 
tto 
VA-FA 
Events per Route per Year 
m y/^h uXUUI I II I I \i\ 
Routes 
Figure 16. Number of Events per Route per Year Report. 
The result has enabled risk comparison in terms of parameter exceedances for the 
routes considered. Interpretation of the results presented throughout Chapter IV has been 
discussed in Chapter V. 
Chapter V 
DISCUSSION 
The practical results of this study can be concisely interpreted as the generation of 
HFOQA. The partnership comprising the helicopter operator, a FOQA analysis software 
vendor, and a representative of academia assembled the necessary requirements, tools, 
and research efforts to develop HFOQA. 
Addressing the specifics, the HFOQA analysis software was prepared to be used 
by the helicopter industry in any of its different types of operations. In fact, the HFOQA 
process has already been used in a successful manner by the aforementioned offshore 
helicopter operator in its daily operations. 
The HFOQA GDRAS was developed from a capable, well recognized, and highly 
accepted fixed-wing FOQA GDRAS. Extensive prior fixed-wing experience of the 
FOQA vendor was critical to the efficiency and accuracy of the project. The single 
helicopter operator presented its needs and a sample of de-identified digital flight data, 
thereby providing both the required motivation and the check-and-balance necessary to 
achieve the utilitarian, real world solutions. 
Ultimately, integration of the industry apparatus and requirements with the 
research knowledge and capabilities of the academic representative were vital in 
achieving the results of the study. In line with the flow of the software development 
process, the chronological interpretations that follow address the three objectives of the 
project: HFOQA flight phases, HFOQA events, and HFOQA measurements. 
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Interpretation of HFOQA Flight Phases 
The diverse helicopter flight attitudes, encountered from the preflight 
(commencing when the aircraft has initially been electrically powered) through the 
helicopter's engine(s) shutdown, were characterized by relevancy and parsed into flight 
phases. Each of the created flight phases (see Figure 11): 
1. Had a significant operational meaning. 
2. Was considered essential to the understanding of helicopter flight. 
3. Provided statistical tracking of events and measurements. 
Total reprogramming of the fixed-wing GDRAS used as the basis for the HFOQA 
GDRAS was necessary to address the characteristics of helicopter flight. Several 
specifics differentiated a helicopter flight profile from a fixed-wing flight profile; for 
example, the helicopter's hover capability. Moreover, different models of helicopters 
required different manners to achieve distinct flight characteristics. For example, one 
helicopter might be able to perform a running takeoff from a runway on its own wheels, 
whereas another model of helicopter has needed to assume a hover attitude prior to 
takeoff. Thus, Chapter IV's programmed HFOQA flight phases included all types of 
helicopters and their capabilities, primarily during the close-to-the-ground flight 
maneuvers (e.g., the programmed HFOQA flight phases: [a] Air Taxi Out/In, [b] Go 
Around, and [c] Touch and Go need further amplification). 
Air Taxi Out/In flight phases were programmed to specifically address the 
operation of a helicopter with skids or float landing gear. Taxiing of this type of 
helicopter has occurred after the rotorcraft has become airborne, due to the absence of 
wheels. Skids have proliferated as landing gear on helicopters. Landing gear consisting of 
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the less common floats for helicopters have been employed by those operators that 
needed to land on lakes and/or rivers. 
The Go Around HFOQA flight phase represented an aborted landing of a 
helicopter that had commenced the final approach. The Touch and Go HFOQA flight 
phase has occurred when, after landing, the helicopter has been obligated to takeoff 
again. These two HFOQA flight phases were programmed to monitor critical, assumed 
helicopter flight states during the significant phase of approach for landing. 
Usually, the need for a Go Around could be determined by either ATC or the pilot 
in command; for example, when an obstructed landing area has presented itself or an 
unstabilized approach has occurred. However, in many helicopter operations, landings 
have occurred in unfamiliar areas with no ATC services available. Therefore, the decision 
to Go Around has become solely the captain's initiative, thereby increasing the risk of the 
operation. 
The Touch and Go occurrences envisioned during the programming process were, 
for example, those related to the pilot's maneuvering to avoid a helicopter ground 
resonance phenomenon. The ground resonance phenomenon has developed when the 
helicopter rotor blades move out of phase with each other and cause the rotor disc to 
become unbalanced. This emergency situation has resulted in the entire hull being ripped 
apart by the aircraft's own extreme oscillations, especially when the skids or wheels have 
touched the ground lightly. If the pilot has maintained the rotor rpm within the normal 
operating range after touchdown, immediate takeoff can restore rotor balance. In other 
words, breaking contact with the ground has been the best technique to break free of a 
ground resonance incident (Lewis & Darbo, 2006). 
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Interpretation of HFOQA Events 
The programmed HFOQA events, as introduced in Chapter IV, consisted of 
operational and maintenance events. Each HFOQA event was designed with three levels 
of severity. A real world test flight was flown to evaluate the software capability to 
precisely detect the programmed HFOQA events. 
The resultant HFOQA operational events (see Appendix C), when applicable, 
were designated with the words DEP (Departure) and ARR (Arrival). The events with the 
DEP designation were related to those programmed to detect parameter exceedances 
prior to the Cruise phase of flight. Alternatively, the ARR designated events were those 
planned to identify parameter exceedances that happened during and after the Cruise 
flight phase. Thus, this defined approach to the HFOQA event programming process 
allowed the recognition, through trend analysis, of whether a detected event was likely to 
be related to some operational characteristic of the flight's origin (detected DEP events) 
or the flight's destination (detected ARR events). 
The resultant HFOQA maintenance events basically covered the recorded 
maintenance parameters available, and their established limits, at the time of the project 
development. Beyond the principal function of maintenance anomalies detection, 
HFOQA maintenance events were demonstrated as being a powerful tool complementing 
the flight operational data during specific incident investigations. 
An essential element of the event composition was its severity level. The method 
applied (presented in Chapter IV, Figure 12) in verifying the preliminary established 
limits was effective. Validation of those limits, provided by the offshore helicopter 
operator's chief pilot, resulted in minor refinement. 
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The ultimate verification and validation of the HFOQA events detection 
capabilities were successfully effected through the real world test flight (see Figure 13). 
All assigned exceedances (both operational and maintenance event-related) included in 
the test flight were detected, and their levels of severity were correctly identified. In 
addition, no falsely detected exceedances were observed. 
Interpretation of HFOQA Measurements 
The HFOQA GDRAS has automatically stored in its data base several parameter 
measurements from all input flight data replayed. The two types of HFOQA 
measurements (event-related and safety/efficiency flight profile) introduced in Chapter 
IV enhanced the HFOQA software storage of desired data, thereby enabling a vast array 
of statistical analysis capabilities. Some statistical analysis procedures, considered to be 
of most frequent use, became HFOQA standard statistical reports. 
Two results substantiated the establishment of measurements associated with 
HFOQA events as a valuable strategy. First, this approach assured that relevant 
information was being stored, provided the data comprised parameters generated by prior 
recognized risks (events). Second, the adopted measurement strategy was able to 
anticipate the actual events. After the event-related measurements programming, the 
spectrum of stored parameter data available increased significantly, as did the HFOQA 
statistical analysis capability. 
Despite the fact that event-related measurements added a significant amount of 
data to the HFOQA statistical module, the second type (safety/efficiency flight profile) of 
measurements added little data, but the data were operationally-specific. The safety/ 
efficiency flight profile measurements, depicted in Table 7, were created to address 
requests from the offshore helicopter operator. The five measurements listed successfully 
addressed critical points of interest for the offshore operation. The measurements were 
elaborated to assist in the analysis of issues that have affected offshore helicopter flight 
performance on, or around, the offshore platform. For example: 
1. The behavior of the helicopter during takeoff and landing, from and onto the 
oil rig, were assessed through the DMC and rig landing measurements. 
2. The characteristics of the offshore platform in terms of movement (roll, pitch, 
and heave), and air temperature were covered by the helideck movement and 
hot plume measurements. 
3. The in-flight helicopter that has arrived at the oil rig, but has waited for 
landing for a certain (unacceptable) amount of time, was addressed through 
the programmed orbit snapshot measurement. This measurement has been 
salient, because it has allowed observance of any unnecessary helicopter risk 
exposure. (In the event of a critical component failure, the helicopter's only 
other option for landing would be the sea.) 
Chapter IV provided a comprehensive treatment of the HFOQA standard 
statistical reports. The chapters that follow (VI and VII) have respectively been devoted 
to the conclusions and recommendations of this HFOQA study. 
Chapter VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The HFOQA study commenced with a comprehensive literature review from 
which stemmed the research hypothesis. The foci of the literature reviewed were the 
safety aspects of the two subjects of concern, FOQA and the helicopter industry - plus 
the combination of them as empirically studied in the HOMP trials. The resultant guiding 
research hypothesis was that the refinement and/or development of flight phases, events, 
and measurements of the HFOQA analysis software were feasible (refer to Chapter II for 
the complete hypothesis statement). Thus, the study concludes with a synthesis of the 
interrelated findings for FOQA, helicopters, and the developed HFOQA, having utilized 
the relevant literature and the derived research hypothesis as the framework. 
The incorporation of the FOQA concept, which can be viewed as an independent 
variable for this study, into the helicopter industry (as a dependent variable) has been 
demonstrated as both feasible and valuable for the improvement of aviation safety. The 
literature revealed that FOQA has become an indispensable element within the SMS of 
many airlines. Major airlines of the world have used FOQA data since the 1960s. The 
cyclic nature of the FOQA process has included flight data acquisition, followed by 
analysis and utilization thereof. The quantitative information provided by FOQA has the 
stamp of objectivity. FOQA data have disclosed to the aviation industry what has actually 
occurred during flight operations. Consequently, flight safety benefits and operational 
cost savings have been realized. 
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The helicopter industry has not experienced the safety improvements/records of 
the airline industry. Although helicopters participate in many highly-relevant aviation 
activities in our society, the helicopter accident rate has been acknowledged as excessive. 
Consequently, the stakeholders have decided to drive attitudes and implement safety 
innovations that aim to reduce the helicopter accident rate by 80% by 2016. The North 
Sea offshore helicopter industry, for example, has considerably reduced its accident rate 
during the years through investment in applied research projects. One of these initiatives 
has been the implementation of FOQA for helicopters, which has estimates of a 15-17% 
reduction in helicopter accidents. 
The HOMP trials were the first applications of FOQA concepts to helicopter 
operations. The real world trials were located in the North Sea and were sponsored by the 
UK CAA and other stakeholders. The successful outcomes of HOMP translated to the 
UKOOA members' commitment of HOMP implementation on all FDR-equipped UK 
public transport helicopters over the UK Continental Shelf. 
This study's methodology (and the resultant product) comprised development of a 
helicopter version of FOQA analysis software - labeled HFOQA, with direct application 
to the helicopter industry. Mixed methods were designed to combine qualitative data 
from helicopter and FOQA experts with quantitative data represented by a sample of de-
identified digital flight data. In compliance with the working hypothesis, flight phases, 
events, and measurements were the three domains of interest during the development of 
the HFOQA software. 
The developed HFOQA analysis software can identify 17 different flight phases 
of a typical helicopter flight profile. These flight phases characterize diverse helicopter 
flight attitudes, and meet different helicopter model capabilities and missions. This 
programmed flexibility enables the use of the HFOQA software as an effective safety 
tool by operators of all types of operations within the helicopter community with no 
programming changes of the flight phases. 
The developed HFOQA events detect a broad range of maintenance and 
operational risks, as well as assign severity levels. Probing deeper than event detection, 
the combination of maintenance and operational data strengthens HFOQA analysis 
capabilities in the investigation of specific incidents. Additionally, applicable correlations 
can be obtained between the detected event and the flight origin or destination. 
Recorded measurements, from all input flight data replayed, enhance the HFOQA 
GDRAS storage of data and provide broad statistical analysis capabilities. There are two 
types of HFOQA measurements: event-related measurements and safety/efficiency flight 
profile measurements. Overviews of helicopter operations, absent the preexamination of 
events, are possible. HFOQA standard statistical reports are available for the frequently 
utilized analyses. 
This HFOQA software development, resulting from an industry-academia 
partnership, has resulted in acceptance of the working research hypothesis. This study 
also concludes that HFOQA 7s contribution to the consolidation and expansion of FOQA 
concepts throughout the helicopter environment (in demand by the aviation industry) has 
been successfully achieved. 
Chapter VII 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The worldwide helicopter industry is currently experiencing a favorable economic 
period. However, helicopter operations suffer from a considerably higher accident rate 
than that reported by (mostly non-profitable) major airlines. A hidden lining is that the 
helicopter manufacturers, the operators, the customer organizations, and the regulators 
have acknowledged, and commenced work, on the necessity for safer operations. 
The North Sea's offshore oil exploration stakeholders have set a realistic example 
for the entire industry. Since the 1990s, significant safety improvements have been 
achieved in that geo-region. Industry partnerships involving investment in applied 
research have generated effective tools to reduce the number of accidents. The outcome 
of FOQA for helicopters is one of these tools; it has the potential to enhance the safety 
and the quality of flight operations. 
This HFOQA study addressed the development and refinement of flight phases, 
events, and measurements for the HFOQA analysis software. A FOQA vendor, an 
offshore helicopter operator, and a representative of academe comprised the partnership 
that was essential to the success of the HFOQA software development. Group dynamics 
and understanding provided the motivation and structure for the study. The partnership's 
composition naturally resulted in accentuated advances in HFOQA features specific to 
the offshore industry (e.g., the developed safety/efficiency flight profile measurements 
addressed offshore platform issues). Notwithstanding the involvement of only an offshore 
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operator, the HFOQA software was designed to be utilized by the helicopter community 
in its entirety. 
Therefore, the following suggestions are recommended for future studies: 
1. Assemble partnerships among helicopter operators, FOQA analysis software 
vendors, and academe to aggregate the industry experience and knowledge, 
the apparatus, and the scientific research familiarity in effecting new HFOQA 
analysis capabilities. 
2. Assemble partnerships with helicopter operators involved with different 
missions (e.g., EMS, sightseeing, military, and others) to assess the necessities 
of the diverse helicopter community for the development of new HFOQA 
analysis tools. 
3. Develop new safety/efficiency flight profile measurements to meet other 
offshore helicopter operation demands (e.g., pilot workload). 
4. Develop new measurements, both event-related and safety/efficiency flight 
profile, for other facets of the helicopter community. 
5. Develop additional standard statistical reports that are readily available to the 
HFOQA analyst. 
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Event 
Number 
01A 
01B 
01C 
01D 
01E 
02.A 
02 B 
02C 
02 D 
02E 
Title 
High Pitch-Up Attitude 
Below 20 ft AGL 
High Pitch-Up Attitude 
Above 20 ft and Below 500 
ft AGL 
High Pitch-Up Attitude 
Above 500 ft AGL 
High Pitch-Up Attitude 
Below 90 knots IAS 
High Pitch-Up Attitude 
Above 90 knots IAS 
High Pitch-Down Attitude 
Below 20 ft AGL 
High Pitch-Down Attitude 
Above 20 ft and Below 50O 
ft AGL 
High Pitch-Down Attitude 
Above 500 ft AGL 
High Pitch-Down Attitude 
Below 90 knots IAS 
High Pitch-Down Attitude 
Above 90 knots IAS 
Applicable 
Condition 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Trigger Parameters 
Pi ten Attitude Radio 
Altitude 
Pitch Attitude, Radio 
Altitude 
Pitch Attitude, Radio 
Altitude 
Pitch Attitude, Indicated 
Airspeed 
Pitch Attitude Indicated 
Airspeed 
Pitch Attitude, Radio 
Altitude 
Pitch Attitude, Radio 
Altitude 
Pitch Attitude, Radio 
Altitude 
Pitch Attitude Indicated 
Airspeed 
Pitch Attitude Indicated 
Airspeed 
Rationale 
To detect the risk of a tail rotor strike. 
To detect excessive flare angle i e. rushed final approach, likely to 
alarm passengers or cause crew to lose visual reference. 
To detect excessive pitch up attitude in flight 
To detect excessive pitch up attitude at lower speeds. 
To detect excessive pitch up attitude at higher speeds. 
To detect excessive nose down pitch attitude during take-off 
transition which might result in striking the ground if an engine 
failed 
To detect excessive nose down pitch attitude during take-off 
transition and at other lower level flight conditions. 
To detect excessive pitch down attitude in flight. 
To detect excessive pitch down attitude at lower speeds. 
To detect excessive pitch down attitude at higher speeds. 
Event 
Number 
03A 
03B 
04A 
04B 
05A 
05B 
06A 
06 B 
06C 
06D 
07A 
Title 
High Pitch Rate Below 500 
ft AGL 
High Pitch Rate Above 500 
ft AGL 
Low Maximum Pitch Rate 
on Rig Take-Off 
High Maximum Pitch Rate 
on Rig Take-Off 
Low Maximum Pitch-Do wri 
Attitude on Rig Take-Off 
High Maximum Pitch-Down 
Attitude on Rig Take-Off 
Roll Attitude Above 30 deg 
Below 300 ft AGL 
Roll Attitude Above 40 deg 
Below 300 ft AGL 
Roll Attitude Above 30 deg 
Above 300 ft AGL 
Roll Attitude Above 40 deg 
Above 300 ft AGL 
High Roll Rate Below 500 ft 
AGL 
Applicable 
Condition 
Air 
Air 
Rig Take-Off 
Rig Take-Off 
Rig Take-Off 
Rig Take-Off 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Trigger Parameters 
Pitch Rate, Radio Altitude 
Pitch Rate, Radio Altitude 
Pitch Rate 
Pitch Rate 
Pitch Attitude 
Pitch Attitude 
Roll Attitude, Radio Altitude 
Roll Attitude, Radio Altitude 
Roll Attitude, Radio AJtitude 
Roll Attitude, Radio AJtitude 
Roll Rate, Radio Altitude 
Rationale 
To detect excessive rate of change of pitch attitude at lower level 
flight conditions. 
To detect excessive rate of change of pitch attitude in flight. 
To detect a low helicopter rotation rate during rotation on a take-off 
from a helideck which could result in a deck strike if an engine 
failed. 
To detect a high helicopter rotation rate dunng rotation on a take-
off from a helideck. which might cause crew disorientation and 
passenger alarm. 
To detect a low nose down pitch attitude dunng rotation on a take-
off from a helideck, which could result in a deck strike if an engine 
failed. 
To detect a high nose down pitch attitude during rotation on a take-
off from a helideck, which might cause crew disorientation and 
passenger alarm. 
To detect exceedance of the Flight Manual roll attitude limit for 
weights above 18 410 lb at lower level flight conditions. 
To detect exceedance of the Flight Manual roll attitude limit for 
weights above 17,200 lb at lower level flight conditions. 
To detect exceedance of the Flight Manual roll attitude limit for 
weights above 18,410 lb 
To detect exceedance of the Flight Manual roll attitude limit for 
weights above 17.200 lb. 
To detect excessive roll rate at lower level flight conditions. 
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Event 
Number 
07B 
08A 
08 B 
08 C 
09A 
10A 
10B 
10C 
10D 
10E 
10F 
11A 
Tide 
High Roll Rate Above 500 ft 
AGL 
High Rate of Descent 
Below 500 ft AGL 
High Rate of Descent 
Above 500 ft AGL 
High Rate of Descent 
Below 30 knots LAS 
Low Airspeed Above 500 ft 
AGL 
Normal Acceleration Above 
500 ft .AGL 
Normal Acceleration Below 
500 ft AGL 
Lateral Acceleration Above 
500 ft AGL 
Lateral Acceleration Below 
500 ft AGL 
Longitudinal Acceleration 
Above 500 ft AGL 
Longitudinal Acceleration 
Below 500 ft AGL 
Excessive Lateral Cyclic 
Control 
Applicable 
Condition 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Take-Off 
Cruise 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Trigger Parameters 
Roll Rate Radio Altitude 
Rate of Descent, Radio 
Altitude 
Rate of Descent Radio 
Altitude 
Rate of Descent, Indicated 
Airspeed 
Indicated Airspeed 
Normal Acceleration, Radio 
Altitude 
Normal Acceleration, Radio 
Altitude 
Lateral Acceleration, Radio 
Altitude 
Lateral Acceleration, Radio 
Altitude 
Longitudinal Acceleration, 
Radio Altitude 
Longitudinal Acceleration, 
Radio Altitude 
Lateral Cyclic Pitch 
Rationale 
To detect excessive roll rate in flight. 
To detect an excessive rate of descent at low height. 
To detect an excessive rate of descent. 
To detect an excessive rate of descent at low airspeed (where 
there is danger of entering the vortex ring state). 
To detect flight at an unusually low airspeed. 
To detect a high normal acceleration in flight due to tuibulence or a 
manoeuvre. 
To detect a high normal acceleration at lower level flight conditions 
due to turbulence or a manoeuvre. 
To detect a high lateral acceleration in flight due to turbulence or a 
manoeuvre. 
To detect a high lateral acceleration at tower level flight conditions 
due to turbulence or a manoeuvre. 
To detect a high longitudinal acceleration in flight due to turbulence 
or a manoeuvre. 
To detect a high longitudinal acceleration at lower level flight 
conditions due to turbulence or a manoeuvre. 
To detect movement of the lateral cyclic control to extreme left or 
right positions. 
Event 
Number 
11B/C 
12A 
12B 
13A 
14A 
14B 
14C 
15A 
15B 
16A 
17A/C 
17B/D 
Title 
Excessive Longitudinal 
Cyclic Control 
Excessive Collective Pitch 
Control in Level Flight 
Excessrve Collective Pitch 
Control 
Pilot Event Marker Pressed 
IAS Mode Engaged Below 
60 knot3 IAS 
ALT Mode Engaged Below 
60 knots IAS 
HDG Mode Engaged Below 
60 knots IAS. 
Gear Selected Up Below 
100 ft AGL on Take-off 
Gear Not Selected Down 
Below 300 ft AGL on 
Landing 
Excessrve Time in Avoid 
Area 
VNO Exceedance 
VNE Exceedance 
Applicable 
Condition 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Take-Off 
Landing 
Air 
Air 
Trigg er Para rn et ers 
Longitudinal Cyclic Pitch 
Collective Pitch. Rate of 
Descent 
Collective Pitch 
Autopilot IAS Mode 
Indicated Airspeed 
Autopilot ALT Mode, 
Indicated Airspeed 
Autopilot HDG Mode, 
Indicated Airspeed 
Gear Select Radio AJtitude 
Gear Select, Radio .Altitude 
VNO, Weight 
VNE, Weight 
Rationale 
To detect movement of the longitudinal cyclic control to extreme 
forward or aft positions. 
To detect approaches to, or exceedances of. Flight Manual 
collective pitch limits for cruising flight. 
To detect exceedances of the absolute maximum Flight Manual 
collective pitch limit 
To detect when the FDR pilot event marker has been pressed-
To detect inappropriate engagement of autopilot airspeed hold at 
low airspeeds 
To detect inappropriate engagement of autopilot altitude hold at 
low airspeeds. 
To detect inappropriate engagement of auto pi lot heading hold at 
low airspeeds. 
To detect early retraction of the landing gear during take-off. 
To detect late lowering of the landing gear during landing. 
Not yet implemented (awaiting low airspeed algorithm). 
To detect exceedance of the Flight Manual VNO limit (this is 
weight dependent). 
To detect exceedance of the Flight Manual VNE limit (this is weight 
dependent). 
Event 
N u m b e r 
ISA 
18B 
ISA 
19B 
20A 
21A 
21 B 
22A 
22B 
23A 
23B 
24A 
Tit le 
No. 1 (LH) Fuel Contents 
L o w 
No. 2 (RH) Fuel Contents 
Low 
Heater On Dur ing Take-Off 
Heater On During Landing 
Early Turn on Of fshore 
Take-Off at Night 
High Ground Speed W i th i n 
20 seconds of Rig Landing 
High Ground Speed Wi th in 
10 seconds of Ai rpor t 
Landing 
High Ai rspeed Below 100 ft 
AGL 
High Ai rspeed Below 100 ft 
AGL and Gear Up 
D o w n w i n d Flight Wi th in 60 
seconds of Take-Off 
D o w n w i n d Flight Wi th in 60 
seconds of Landing 
Low Rotor S p e e d - Power 
On 
Applicable 
Condit ion 
Air 
Air 
Take-Off 
Landing 
Rig Take-Off 
Rig Landing 
Airport 
Landing 
Air 
Air 
Take-Off 
Landing 
Air 
Trigger Parameters 
LH Fuel Contents 
RH Fuel Contents 
Heater 
Heater 
Heading. Ground Speed 
Ground Speed 
Ground Speed 
Indicated Airspeed, Radio 
Al t i tude 
Indicated Airspeed, Radio 
Al t i tude Gear Select 
Indicated Airspeed, Ground 
Speed 
Indicated Airspeed, Ground 
Speed 
Rotor Speed, Total Torque 
Rationale 
To detect if t he total remaining fuel contents fall be low the 
Operations Manual l imit 
To detect if the total remaining fuel contents fall be low the 
Operations Manual l imit. 
To detect non-confonnance w i t h the Flight Manual requirement 
that the cabin heater should be off dur ing take-off, 
To detect non-conformance w i t h the Right Manual requirement 
that the cabin heater should be off dunng landing. 
To detect an early turn after an of fshore take-off at night. 
To detect a high ground speed on t he final approach to a helideck 
landing. 
To detect a high ground speed on the final approach t o an airport 
landing. 
To detect high speed fl ight at l ow level. 
To detect high speed fl ight 8t l o w level w i th the landing gear 
retracted. 
To detect d o w n w i n d flight short ly after take-off. 
To detec t d o w n w i n d f l ight short ly before landing. 
To detect excessively tew rotor speed dur ing power-on f l ight. 
Event 
N u m b e r 
248 
24C 
24D 
25A 
25 B 
26A 
27A 
28A 
29A 
29B 
30A 
31A 
Tit le 
High Rotor Speed - Power 
On 
Low Rotor Speed - Power 
Off 
High Rotor Speed - Power 
Off 
M a x i m u m Cont inuous 
Torque (2 Engines) 
M a x i m u m Take-Off Torque 
(2 Engines) 
Pilot Workload/Turbulence 
Pilot Work load 
Flight Though Ho t Gas 
High Pitch-Up At t i tude on 
Ground 
High Pi tch-Down At t i tude 
o n Ground 
High Roll At t i tude on 
Ground 
High Norma l Accelerat ion 
at Landing 
Applicable 
Condit ion 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Landing 
Landing 
Take-Off. 
Landing 
Ground 
Ground 
Ground 
Landing, 
Ground 
Trigger Parameters 
Rotor Speed, Total Torque 
Rotor Speed Total Torque 
Rotor Speed, Total Torque 
Total Torque 
Total Torque 
Changes in Collective P i td i 
Collective, Lateral & 
Longitudinal Cyclic 
Outs ide Air Temperature 
Pitch At t i tude 
Pitch At t i tude 
Roll At t i tude 
Normal Accelerat ion 
Rationale 
To detect excessively high rotor speed during power-on f l ight. 
To detect exceedance of the Flight Manual m i n i m u m rotor speed 
l imit for power-off f l ight. 
To detect exceedance of the Flight Manual m a x i m u m rotor speed 
limit for power-off f l ight. 
To detect more than 5 minutes use of the Flight Manual take-off 
rating torque l imit 
To detect exceedance of the Flight Manual absolute max imum 
torque l imit. 
To detect turbulence encountered dur ing the final approach to a 
helideck landing. 
Not yet imp lemented (awaiting ou tcome of CAA research project). 
To detect if the aircraft f l ies through the turbine eff lux or f lare 
p lume dunng a helideck take-off or landing. 
To detect high aircraft pitch angles w h e n on a vessel 's helideck, or 
on sloping ground. 
To detect high aircraft pitch angles w h e n on a vessel 's helideck, or 
on sloping ground. 
To detect high aircraft roll angles dur ing taxi ing, w h e n on a vesse l s 
helideck, or on sloping g round. 
To detect a heavy landing. 
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Event 
Number 
32A 
33A 
34A 
34B 
34 C 
35A'B 
36 A 
36B 
37A 
38A 
38B 
Title 
High Rotor Speed on 
Ground 
Rotor Brake Applied at 
Greater Than 122 Rotor 
RPM 
Excessive Long Cyclic 
Control with Insufficient 
Collective Pitch on Ground 
Excessive Rate of 
Movement of Longitudinal 
Cyclic on Ground 
Excess rve Rate of 
Movement of Lateral Cyclic 
on Ground 
Excessive Movement of 
Deck 
High Lateral Acceleration 
i rap id come ring l 
High Longitudinal 
Acceleration i rap id braking) 
High Ground Speed 
Taxi Limit ileft gear lifts) 
Taxi Limit iright gear lifts) 
Applicable 
Condition 
Ground 
Ground 
Ground 
Ground 
Ground 
Helideck 
Ground 
Ground 
Ground 
Ground 
Ground 
Trigger Parameters 
Rotor Speed 
Rotor Brake, Rotor Speed 
Collective Pitch, 
Longitudinal Cyclic Pitch 
Longitudinal Cyclic Pitch 
Rate, Rotor Speed 
Lateral Cyclic Pitch Rate, 
Rotor Speed 
Motion Seventy Index 
Lateral Acceleration 
Longitudinal Acceleration 
Ground Speed 
Lateral Cyclic Pitch, Tail 
Rotor Pedal 
Lateral Cyclic Pitch, Tail 
Rotor Pedal 
Rationale 
To detect possible governor problems on the ground. 
To detect application of the rotor brake above the Flight Manual 
limit for rotor speed. 
To detect incorrect taxi technique likely to cause rotor head 
damage 
To detect an excessive rate of movement of the longitudinal cyclic 
control when on the ground with rotors running. 
To detect an excessive rate of movement of the lateral cyclic 
control when on the ground with rotors running. 
To detect excessive movement of a vessel's helideck when the 
helicopter is on the deck-
To detect excessive cornenng accelerations/speeds when taxiing. 
To detect excessive deceleration due to braking when taxiing. 
To detect excessive taxiing speeds. 
To detect the risk of an aircraft roll over due to incorrect tail rotor 
pedal and lateral cyclic control positions when taxiing. 
To detect the risk of an aircraft roll over due to incorrect tail rotor 
pedal and lateral cyclic control positions when taxiing. 
Event 
Number 
3SA 
40A 
41A 
41B 
41C 
42A 
42 B 
Thie 
Single Engined flight 
Torque Split in the Cruise 
•Go Around 
Below Minimum Height on 
Go Around 
Below Minimum Height on 
•Go Around at Night 
Autopilot Engaged On 
Ground Before Take-Off 
Autopilot Engaged On 
Ground After Landing 
Applicable 
Condition 
Air 
Cruise 
Cruise, 
Landing 
Cruise. 
Landing 
Cnjise, 
Landing 
Ground 
Ground 
Trigger Parameters; 
No 1 Eng Tongue, No 2 Eng 
Torque 
No 1 Eng Torque, No 2 Eng 
Torque 
Gear Select 
Gear Select, Radio AJtitude 
Gear Select, Radio Altitude 
Autopilot Status 
Autopilot Status 
Rationale 
To detect single engined flight. 
To detect a possible engine problem, subsequently found to have 
been caused by module 2 stator vane rotation. 
To detect a go-around. 
To detect a descent below the minimum height limit during a go 
around. 
To detect a descent below the minimum height limit during a go 
around at night. 
To detect premature engagement of the autopilot prior to take-off 
which could result in unexpected control movements. 
To detect failure to disengage the autopilot after landing which 
could result in unexpected control movements. 
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APPENDIX B 
HOMP Trial Measurement List 
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Measurement 
Pitch below 20ft AGL 
Pitch between 20ft and 500ft AGL 
Pitch above 500ft AGL 
Pitch below 90kts IAS 
Pitch above 90kts IAS 
Pitch rate be low BOOft AGL 
Pitch rate above BOOft A 3L 
Roll below 300ft AGL 
Roll above 300ft AGL 
Roll rate below 500ft AGL 
Roll rate above 500ft AGL 
Yaw rate 
Rate of Descent below 50Oft AGL 
Rate of Descent above BOOft AGL 
Rate of Descent below 30kts IAS 
IAS above BOOft AGL 
Lateral acceleration above BOOft AGL 
Lateral acceleration below BOOft AGL 
Longitudinal acceleration above BOOft AGL 
Appl icable Cond i t i on 
Air 
Air 
Ajr 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air ilndrvidual phases' 
Air ilndrvidual phasesi 
Air (Individual phasesi 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Values 
Max +ve, Mm - v e 
Max +ve. Mm - v e 
Ma> +ve M i n - ^ e 
Max +ve, Mm -VAS 
Man +ve, M i n ^ v e 
Max absolute 
May absolute 
Max absolute 
Max absolute 
Max absolute 
Max absolute 
Max +ve. Mm - v e 
Max 
Max 
Ma> 
Mm 
Max absolute 
Max absolute 
Ma> absolute 
Measurement 
Longitudinal acceleration below 500ft AGL 
Normal acceleration above 500ft AGL 
Normal acceleration below BOOft AGL 
Lateral cyclic control 
Longitudinal cyclic control 
Collect rve pitch control 
IAS at which IAS mode engaged 
IAS at which ALT mode engaged 
IAS at which HDG mode engaged 
IAS 
IAS below 100ft AGL 
Main rotor speed above 10% total torque 
Main rotor speed below 10% total torque 
Total torque 
Increase in OAT 
Ng engine 1 
Ng engine 2 
Engine gas temperature engine 1 
Engine gas temperature engine 2 
Ice detector 
IGB oil temperature 
Appl icable Cond i t i on 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Ajr 
Air (Individual phases/ 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air (Individual phases) 
Air 
Air ilndrvidual phases) 
Air (Individual phases) 
A i r (Individual phases,' 
Air (Individual phases/ 
Air 
Air 
Values 
Max absolute 
Max absolute 
Max absolute 
M a x , Mm 
Max, Mm 
Ma> 
Mm 
Mm 
Mm 
Max 
Ma> 
Max Mm 
Ma>, Mm 
Max 
Max 
Max 
Max 
Max 
Ma> 
Max 
Ma> 
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Measurement 
MGB oil pressure 
MGB oil temperature 
TGB oil temperature 
Pressure altitude 
Pilot workload/turbulence (collective only) 
Pitdi 
Roll 
Main rotor speed 
Longitudinal cyclic control 
Longitudinal cyclic control rate 
Lateral cyclic control rate 
Motion Severity lnde\ lexcluding airports'' 
Lateral acceleration 
Longitudinal acceleration 
Ground speed 
NMLA datum value 
Fuel contents tank 1 
Fuel contents tank 2 
Fuel remaining tank 1 
Fuel remaining tank 2 
Applicable Condition 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Air 
Ground 
Ground 
Ground 
Ground 
Ground 
Ground 
Ground 
Ground 
Ground 
Ground 
When calculated 
At takeoff 
At take-off 
At landing 
At landing 
Values 
Max,. Mm 
Max 
Max 
Max 
Max 
Ma> Mm 
Max absolute 
Max 
Max 
Max absolute 
Max absolute 
Max 
Max absolute 
Max absolute 
Max 
Value 
Value 
Value 
Value 
Value 
Measurement 
Ajrcraft weight 
Aircraft weight 
Rad alt at gear selected up 
Rad aft at gear selected down 
Normal acceleration at landing 
MR speed at application of rotor brake 
Engine gas temperature engine 1 
Engine gas temperature, engine 2 
Pitch rate, ng take-off 
Pitch rig take-off 
Rad alt, rig take-off 
Ground speed, rig landing 
Ground speed, airport landing 
Pressure altitude 
Pressure altitude 
OAT 
OAT 
Average wind speed 
Average wind direction 
Applicable Condition 
At takeoff 
At landing 
At gear up 
At gear down 
At landing 
MR brake applied 
At engine start 
At engine start 
At rotation point 
At rotation point 
At max pitch rate 
Point before landing 
Point before landing 
At takeoff 
At landing 
At takeoff 
At landing 
Point after TO & before LDG 
Point after TO & before LDG 
Values 
Value 
Value 
Value 
Value 
Max 
Value 
Max 
Max 
Max 
Max 
Value 
Value 
Value 
Value 
Value 
Value 
Value 
Value 
Value 
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Measurement Point Comments Measurements 
RIG TAKE-OFF PROFILE 
1 Liftoff 
2 Rotation - Maximum Pitdi Rate 
3 Rotation - Maximum Pitch Down Angle 
4 35. knots Airspeed 
E VyvClimb Speed i 
6 Gear Selected Up 
7 200 RVet AAL 
8 500 Feet AAL 
9 1 000 Feet AAL 
Take-off reference point 
Usually coincides with start of rotation 
Usually coincides with end of rotation 
Lift-off point if airspeed greater than 35 kts 
at lift-off 
Obtained from Flight Manual 
End of take-off phase if gear not retracted 
by then 
Definition of climb out path 
Definition of climb out path 
Definition of climb out path 
Time, Pressure Altitude, Latitude, Longitude 
Time from TakeOff, Radio Altitude Pressure Altitude 
CAAU, Pitch. Roll, Heading, Airspeed Groundspeed, 
Latitude (N/S distance from take-off) Longitude (W/E 
distance from take-off J 
RIG LANDING PROFILE 
l Touch-down 
2 35 knots Airspeed 
3 Gear Selected Down 
4 1 000 Feet AAL 
5 500 Feet AAL 
6 200 Feet AAL 
7 Maximum Pilot Workload 
Landing reference point 
Start of low airspeed phase 
Start of landing phase if gear already down 
b v then 
Definition of approach path 
Definition of approach path 
Definition of approach path 
Workload based on collective onfy 
Time, Pressure Altitude Latitude Longitude 
Time to Landing, Radio Altitude, Pressure Altitude 
(AAU, Pitch. Roll Heading Airspeed Groundspeed, 
Latitude <N/S distance from landing,', Longitude (W/E 
distance from landingi 
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APPENDIX C 
HFOQA Operational Event List 
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Operational Event Name 
1 PITCH UP below 20ft - Departure (DEP) 
2 PITCH UP between 20ft and 500ft - DEP 
3 PITCH UP above 500ft 
4 PITCH UP below 90kt Indicated Air Speed (IAS) - DEP 
5 PITCH UP above 90kt IAS 
6 PITCH UP on the Ground - DEP 
7 PITCH UP below 20ft - Arrival (ARR) 
8 PITCH UP between 20ft and 500ft - ARR 
9 PITCH UP below 90kt - ARR 
10 PITCH DOWN below 20ft - DEP 
11 PITCH DOWN between 20ft and 500ft - DEP 
12 PITCH DOWN above 500ft 
13 PITCH DOWN below 90kt IAS - DEP 
14 PITCH DOWN above 90kt IAS - DEP 
15 PITCH DOWN on the Ground - DEP 
16 PITCH DOWN below 20ft - Arrival (ARR) 
17 PITCH DOWN between 20ft and 500ft - ARR 
18 PITCH DOWN below 90kt - ARR 
19 High Maximum PITCH DOWN on Rig Take off 
20 Low Maximum PITCH DOWN on Rig Take off 
21 PITCH DOWN below 20ft - ARR 
22 PITCH DOWN between 20ft and 500ft - ARR 
23 PITCH DOWN below 90kt IAS - ARR 
24 PITCH DOWN above 90kt IAS - ARR 
25 PITCH DOWN on the Ground - ARR 
26 PITCH RATE on the Ground - DEP 
27 High Maximum PITCH RATE on Rig Take off 
28 Low Maximum PITCH RATE on Rig Take off 
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Operational Event Name 
29 PITCH RATE above 500ft 
30 PITCH RATE below 500ft - DEP 
31 PITCH RATE on the Ground - ARR 
32 PITCH RATE below 500ft - ARR 
33 ROLL below 300ft - DEP 
34 ROLL above 300ft 
3 5 ROLL on the Ground - DEP 
3 6 ROLL below 300ft - ARR 
3 7 ROLL on the Ground - ARR 
3 8 ROLL RATE below 500ft - DEP 
39 ROLL RATE above 500ft 
40 ROLL RATE on the Ground - DEP 
41 ROLL RATE below 500ft - ARR 
42 ROLL RATE on the Ground - ARR 
43 ROLL CYCLIC CONTROL - DEP 
44 ROLL CYCLIC CONTROL - ARR 
45 ROLL CYCLIC CONTROL on the Ground - DEP 
46 ROLL CYCLIC CONTROL on the Ground - ARR 
47 PITCH CYCLIC CONTROL - DEP 
48 PITCH CYCLIC CONTROL - ARR 
49 PITCH CYCLIC CONTROL on the Ground - DEP 
50 PITCH CYCLIC CONTROL on the Ground - ARR 
51 RATE OF DESCENT above 500ft 
52 RATE OF DESCENT below 500ft 
53 RATE OF DESCENT below 30kt - DEP 
54 RATE OF DESCENT below 30kt - ARR 
55 Low IAS above 500ft 
56 High IAS below 100ft - DEP 
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Operational Event Name 
57 High IAS below 100ft and GEAR UP - DEP 
58 High I AS below 100ft - ARR 
59 High IAS below 100ft and GEAR UP - ARR 
60 High IAS and GEAR DOWN - DEP 
61 High IAS and GEAR DOWN - ARR 
62 VERTICAL ACCELERATION above 500ft 
63 VERTICAL ACCELERATION below 500ft 
64 VERTICAL ACCELERATION on Landing 
65 LATERAL ACCELERATION above 500ft 
66 LATERAL ACCELERATION below 500ft 
67 LATERAL ACCELERATION on the Ground - DEP 
68 LATERAL ACCELERATION on the Ground - ARR 
69 LONGITUDINAL ACCELERATION above 500ft 
70 LONGITUDINAL ACCELERATION below 500ft 
71 LONGITUDINAL ACCELERATION on the Ground - DEP 
72 LONGITUDINAL ACCELERATION on the Ground - ARR 
73 High GROUND SPEED within 10 seconds of Airport Landing 
74 High GROUND SPEED within 20 seconds of Rig Landing 
75 Downwind flight within 60 seconds of Take off 
76 Downwind flight within 60 seconds of Landing 
77 Velocity-Normal Operation (VNO) 
78 Orbit Detection 
79 Rig Landing Detection 
80 Helideck Movement - ROLL 
81 Helideck Movement - PITCH 
82 GEAR UP below 300ft on Landing 
83 GEAR UP below 75ft on Take off 
84 Go Around Detection 
89 
Operational Event Name 
85 Go Around below 75ft 
86 Go Around below 100ft at night 
87 Taxi Speed - DEP 
88 Taxi Speed - ARR 
